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In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court significantly
broadened the scope of the judicial gatekeeping role previously set forth in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., holding that federal dis-
trict judges must ensure that all admitted scientific, technical, and other
specialized expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. Faced with the chal-
lenge of making scientifically, technically, and legally sound admissibility
determinations, many generalist trial judges will inevitably be tempted to
educate themselves on the nature and substance of the complex matters re-
quiring their attention. While some judges may rely on court-appointed tech-
nical advisors, scientfic reference manuals, or privately sponsored judicial
seminars for assistance, other judges may venture into cyberspace, review sci-
entfic journal articles not presented by the parties, or consult colleagues off
the record. However, the extent to which judges can properly engage in such
practices has become a matter of great debate and uncertainty due to the
divergent teachings ofKumho, the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, 28 U.S. C. §§ 144 and 455 (the federal judicial disqualfication
statutes), and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In his Note, the author examines the recently broadened scope of the
judicial gatekeeping role in light of the competing ethical and legislative
forces that seek to limit ajudge's active involvement in the scientyfic, techni-
cal, and other specialized fact-finding process. The author argues that the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Congress, and the Supreme Court
should modify the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 28
U.S.C. § 455, and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) toprohibit sua sponte,
ex parte communications by judges who seek to acquire case-specific scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized evidence not presented by the parties. The
author contends that even if such independent factual inquiries by judges
may increase the likelihood of "correct" admissibility determinations, such
activities run counter to the spirit of our judicial system, which encourages
the vigorous adversarial presentation of evidence and affords all parties un-
biased and impartial gatekeepers.
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I TRODUGqION
As science- and technology-based litigation grows in complexity
and variety,1 federal district judges are playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in manning the gates through which litigants seek to admit
the testimony of highly skilled expert witnesses.2 At the heart of this
"gatekeeping" role, the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
1 See, eg., Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (alleging that volatile
organic compounds emitted from new carpet caused respiratory ailments); Baker v.
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248 (1st Cir. 1998) (alleging that intrauterine
contraceptive device caused pelvic inflammatory disease and subsequent infertility);
DePaepe v. Cen. Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715 (7th Cir.) (alleging that defectively designed
sun visor caused broken neck in automobile accident), cil. denied, 525 U.S. 1054 (1998);
Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997) (alleging that pesticide
treatments for carpenter ants caused wide-ranging ph)sioogical and cognitive impair-
ments); Brock v. Caterpillar. Inc., 94 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1996) (alleging that defective and
unreasonably dangerous braking system caused bulldozer to lose control); Benedi v. Mc-
Neil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir. 1995) (alleging that combination of alcohol and
acetaminophen caused liver disease); Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th
Cir. 1994) (alleging that silicone breast implants caused autoimmune disease); WiHert v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 995 F. Supp. 979 (D. Minn. 1998) (alleging that antimicrobial medi-
cation caused autoimmune hemolytic anemia and Guillain-Barre Syndrome); Bowers %. N.
Telecom, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (alleging that defectively designed key-
boards caused cumulative trauma disorders, including carpal tunnel syndrome); Cavallo v.
Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1995) (alleging that exposure to aviation jet fuel
sensitized plaintiff to chemicals and caused chronic sinusitis), af'd in prt, dvc in pai, 100
F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996); FED. COURTS STUDY COmm., REPORT OF TI-E FEDER.-L COURTS
STuy ComhrrE 97 (1990) ("Economic, statistical, technological, and natural and social
scientific data are becoming increasingly important in both routine and complex
litigation.").
2 See Marilee M. Kapsa & Carl B. Meyer, Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More
Rdiabe 35 CAl. W. L REv. 313, 318-19 (1999) (discussing how recent Supreme Court
decisions have shifted responsibility for determining the reliability of expert testimony
onto tuialjudges). Kapsa and Meyer note that litigants must often rely upon experts in a
variety of fields to establish causation:
T]he proof of causation may involve five or more specialties. The plaintiff
needs to prove: (a) the presence of a toxic source; (b) the emission rate of
the toxic source; (c) the exposure level; (d) the toxic exposure experienced
by the plaintiff, (e) the dose-response curve for the alleged toxic, and (f)
the correlation between exposure and the symptoms presented by the
plaintiff. The first step involves material sciences and chemistry; the second
and third steps involve occupational hygiene and analytical chemistry; the
third requires construction of a human exposure profile; the fourth in-
volves molecular toxicology; and the last requires coordination between a
clinical toxicologist and the plaintiffs treating physician. Each of these spe-
cialties involves different skills, and each specialist speaks a different
language.
Id. at 320. Because the use of expert witnesses has become increasingly prevalent in com-
plex litigation, some legal scholars have prepared manuals to assist practicing attorneys in
effectively utilizing expert witnesses and attacking opposing witnesses. &e, e.g., 1 D.woIn L
FAIGMAN ET Al., MODERN ScENrrrrc EvwENcr. THE Lw, A\,D SctExcF OF Ex.Err TEsr.N,;
at vii-ix (1997) (noting the text's goal of providing an exhaustive resource for judges and
lawyers in the new world after Daubert v. Merrdl Dow Pharmaceuicals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993)); EDWARD J. hnvomWI.Em, THE METHODS OF ATrACINo Sciuwirc EIDENCE (3d
ed. 1997) (cataloguing strategies for attack on virtually every aspect of expert opinion testi-
mony);JAcnV. MATSON, EFrcrrvE EXPERT %rrxNssso, at v (3d ed. 1999) (noting that the
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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 held that trial judges must ensure
that all admitted expert scientific testimony is both relevant and relia-
ble.4 In the wake of Daubert, some commentators expressed doubts
that federal districtjudges possess the necessary training and expertise
to perform this evaluation.5 However, on the verge of the new millen-
nium, the Court, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,6 reaffirmed the
Daubert Court's confidence in the capacity ofjudges to undertake this
review. In Kumho, the Court significantly broadened the scope of the
gatekeeping role, holding that the admissibility criteria outlined six
years earlier in Daubert7 apply not only to scientific experts, but to ex-
perts in technical and other specialized fields as well.8
With this hefty burden placed on their shoulders, many generalist
trial judges will inevitably be tempted to acquire as much scientific,
technical, and other specialized knowledge as possible in order to
fully comprehend the nature and substance of the complex matters
requiring their attention.9 In today's information age, a vast array of
educational resources exist for those judges who seek to gain knowl-
edge in a wide range of fields such as chemistry, biology, physics, engi-
neering, toxicology, epidemiology, and the like. In addition to
ventures into cyberspace, judges may rely upon numerous other re-
sources including, but not limited to, attendance at judicial seminars,
third edition of the manual was written for those attorneys who "will want to fully under-
stand the evolving rules of the game" so that their "clients can do the very best").
3 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4 See id. at 589-92.
5 Regarding this difficulty, one judge noted recently:
[A]fter serving eighteen years on the bench, including a significant amount
of involvement injudicial training and education, both as a student and a
faculty member, and after an additional eighteen years as a practicing law-
yer and judicial law clerk involved almost daily in the court system, this
writer is convinced that few judges possess the academic credentials or the
necessary experience and training in scientific disciplines to separate com-
petently high quality, intricate scientific research from research that is
flawed.
George D. Marlow, From BlackRobes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications ofa Judge'sSua
Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the Decision-Making
Process, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 291, 333 (1998); see also Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in
the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's Hubris, 43 EMORY LJ. 913, 919 (1994) (noting that
while "[m]ost federal judges are bright individuals," the complexities of much scientific
litigation are beyond their mastery in terms of "deciding what is or is not good science").
6 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
7 See Dauber 509 U.S. at 593-95; infra note 46 and accompanying text.
8 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
9 See Marlow, supra note 5, at 292-93; see also Charles S. Claxton, Characteristics of Effec.
tive Judicial Education Programs, 76JUDIcAcruRE 11, 11-12 (1992) (noting that the complexity
of the issues brought before judges are compounded by three factors: lack of technical
knowledge, the difficulty in evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses, especially in the
face of conflicting testimony, and judicial discretion).
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conversations with court-appointed experts, contact with otherjudges,
discussions with their law clerks, and excursions to the library.10
Many commentators believe that forays into the realm of scien-
tific and technical knowledge are appropriate because the gatekeep-
ing role requires judges to be scientifically literate." However, both
Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States have set
general limits on the extent to which judges may acquire potentially
prejudicial knowledge.' 2 Faced with the challenge of making scientifi-
cally, technically, and legally sound admissibility determinations in the
wake of Kumho, while simultaneously upholding the integrity and in-
dependence of thejudiciary by avoiding the appearance of impropri-
ety and bias,judges must carefully maneuver down an uncharted path.
Along the way, judges have little to guide them with respect to what
10 See; e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Limits onjudgea Lzarning Spealdng and Ading-Payt I-
Tentative First Thoughts: How MayJudges Learn?, 36 Amz. L REv. 539, 541 (1994) (stating
that "[generalistjudges] need to continue to acquire general information-much as any
intelligent, well-educated person does, by reading new-papers, magazines, and books,
watching television and listening to radio, taking adult education and formal college
courses, attending lectures and seminars, and talking to friends and family").
11 See, e.g., Paul S. Miller et al., Daubert and the Necd forJudidal &irntyrc Literay, 77
JuDicATURE 254, 254 (1994) (suggesting that the gatekeeping role outlined by the Su-
preme Court in Daubert requires at minimum "a basic level of scientific literacy"); see also,
&g., David L Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Sdentje¢ Evidence 46 HAMr.Ncs L.J. 555, 579
(1995) (concluding that "although judges need not be expert enough to wTite scientific
articles, they should be proficient enough to read them' and that [sluch proficiency
would entail judges having a basic knowledge of statistics and research methodology").
Miller, Rein, and Bailey elaborate on the scientific literacy judges must possess to fulfill
their Daubert duties:
[judges will need] a grounding in the sociology of science and the scientific
method; the uses and abuses of statistics and probability theory; substantive
awareness of error factors and the limitations on techniques for measure-
ment, data retention, and detection; and specific knowledge of accepted
protocols for making intelligent inquiries into the basis for proffered ex-
pert testimony on scientific techniques and in scientific fields commonly
before trial courts.
Miller et al., supra, at 258.
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994). Section 455 establishes the bases upon which a federal
judge, federal magistrate, orJustice of the Supreme Court may be disqualified from presid-
ing over a case:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualif,
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding ....
Id. Canon 3 (C) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges disqualifies judges on the same
bases. See Om c oF THE GEN. CouNsEL, Ame,. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATESJUDGES 7 (1997) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDL-C]. Section
144 of title 28 sets out the procedure litigants must follow to remove a judge for bias or
prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994); infra Part II.B.2.
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the specific limits are in acquiring scientific, technical, and other spe-
cialized knowledge not presented by the parties in litigation.
This Note examines the recently broadened scope of the judicial
gatekeeping role in light of the competing ethical and legislative
forces that seek to limit a judge's active participation in determining
the scientific and technical reliability of proffered expert testimony.
Part I traces the historical development of the gatekeeping role and its
evolution into a broad-based inquiry that grants federal districtjudges
a significant amount of discretion in determining the reliability and
relevance of proffered scientific, technical, and other specialized testi-
mony. Part II explores the evolution and scope of the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges and 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455-the federal judi-
cial disqualification statutes-as these ethical and legislative codes ap-
ply to the gatekeeping role. Specifically, Part III examines the
beneficial and detrimental aspects of various approaches available to
judges for acquiring scientific, technical, and other specificalized
knowledge. Part III then argues in favor of a more limited judicial
role in the fact-finding process. Part IV proposes modifications to the
Code of Conduct, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)
in order to establish more specific limits on the extent to which judges
may acquire scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge.
These proposed limits would preserve the integrity of the adversarial
process and help maintain an impartial and unbiased judiciary'3 in
light of the modem movement promoting active judicial involvement
in the fact-finding process. 14
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court, Congress, and the
Judicial Conference of the United States should limit the scope of the
judicial gatekeeping role by adopting a specific set of rules that pro-
hibitjudges from acquiring potentially relevant and reliable, case-spe-
cific scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge through
self-initiated investigations and ex parte communications. Adherence
to a strict set of rules would preserve the integrity of the adversarial
system and prevent judges from becoming partial, amateur scientists
who usurp the traditional fact-finding role of the jury.
13 See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 565 ("Judges should be impartial and unbiased.").
14 See Marlow, supra note 5, at 330 ("[A] consensus has developed that trial judges
faced with difficult, complex issues of science ought to be allowed, and perhaps even en-
couraged, to seek scientific research and other information not supplied by the attorneys
[Vol. 86:167
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I
HIsToRIcAL EVOLUTION OF THE JuDiciAL GATEKEING RoLE
A. Frye v. United States and the "General Acceptance" Standard
For much of the last century, federal district judges played a lim-
ited role in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Until
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, judges faced
with determining the admissibility of expert testimony relied upon the
"Frye test" or general acceptance standard first articulated in 1923 in
Frye v. United State. 15
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific princi-
ple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.16
Proponents of the general acceptance standard believed that turning
to the scientific community for guidance in determining the admissi-
bility of expert testimony was the most effective and appropriate
means for ensuring that only sound scientific evidence entered the
courtroom. 17 Instead of requiring generalist trial judges to critically
evaluate the testimony of highly skilled experts, courts admitted only
those theories that the scientific community had generally accepted.' 8
Beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, however,
critics of the general acceptance standard attacked Frye for placing
15 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FRE 702 as staled in Daubert v. Merrdll
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16 Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
17 See Note, ImprovingJudicial Gaiekping. Terhnical Advisors and Sdentific Evidence, 110
Hiv. L REv. 941, 942 (1997) [hereinafter Improving Galdeping] ("FYe's general accept-
ance test relies on the premise that those people most qualified to understand scientific
claims--the scientific community itself-should gauge the validity of those claims.); see
also Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scienific Evidence in a Post-Daubert Wtorld, 84 GEo. LJ.
1985, 1991 (1996) ("Undoubtedly, the Fryetestsurvived forwell over halfa century because
it is intrinsically well-suited to our judiciary.").
18 Sep, ag., United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56,60 (8th Cir. 1990), ordr vacaled and
appeal dismissed 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991); Head v. Lithonia Corp., 881 F.2d 941, 943-
44 (10th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311-15 (5th Cir.),
modified on rehearing 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348,
351-52 (7th Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Richardson.Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 831-32 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1988); L)ch v. Mer-
rell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194-97 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Shorter, 809
F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cr. 1986);
United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985); Ellis v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 745
F.2d 292, 304 n.15 (4th Cir. 1984); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739
F.2d 1028, 1029-33 (5th Cir. 1984), abrogation rtcogni/d by United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d
428 (5th Cir. 1995).
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members of the scientific community in the position of making impor-
tant legal decisions that should have been left to the discretion of the
trialjudge. 19 Some courts rejected Frye on the basis that it prevented
litigants from utilizing the results of relatively new scientific studies
and imposed unfair burdens on plaintiffs who sought to base their
claims on novel scientific theories that were not yet published in peer-
reviewed journals.20 As litigation involving science- and technology-
based controversies grew more complex, the time was ripe for Con-
gress to address many of the pressing evidentiary issues related to ex-
pert testimony that burdened the courts.
B. The Rise of the Federal Rules of Evidence
In 1975, more than halfa century after Frye, Congress enacted the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 21 In particular, Article VII of the Federal
Rules laid the foundation for the admissibility of expert testimony.22
In drafting the specific rule governing the admissibility of expert testi-
mony, however, the drafters disregarded the teachings of Frye and en-
acted a rule that failed to address the general acceptance standard
employed by the courts for over half a century. Rule 702 dramatically
altered the framework previously employed by the courts, stating that
"[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."23 Furthermore, the Advisory Committee's notes following
19 See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: ScwNwC KNoWL-
EDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 11 (1997).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 793-97 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v, Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1287-41 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 465-67 (4ith
Cir. 1975); see also 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 869-74
(John 'William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (discussing some federal courts' rejection of the
Frye test).
21 Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. app.).
22 See FED. R. EvID. 701 to 706. The rules in Article VII relate to the following topics:
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion.
Rule 706. Court appointed experts.
See id.
23 FED. R. EviD. 702. On September 15, 1999, the United States judicial Conference
approved an amended form of Rule 702 which will go into effect on December 1, 2000, if
approved by Congress. See Rules Amendments Approved by the U.S. Judicial Conference, 66 DEF.
CouNs. J. 457, 457 (1999). If approved, the new Rule 702 would read:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
[Vol. 86:167
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Rule 702 failed to discuss whether the scientific community must gen-
erally accept "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"
before a court can admit it.24
In addition to Rule 702, which established the primary framework
for the admissibility of expert testimony, several other rules offer gui-
dance to judges regarding questions of admissibility in general. For
example, Rule 402 specifically addresses relevance.2 As Rule 402
notes, however, there are exceptions to the general rule that all rele-
vant evidence is admissible. For example, Rule 403 provides that
"[relevant] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."2 6
Thus, Rule 403 affords trial judges the discretion under certain cir-
cumstances to exclude relevant and reliable expert testimony on the
basis that its admission would unfairly prejudice one of the parties or
that such testimony would tie up the court's docket for an unreasona-
ble amount of time.
Rule 104 also significantly broadened the decision-making au-
thority of trial judges:
(a) Questions of Admisiiity Generally. Preliminary questions con-
cerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making
its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.27
In particular, Rule 104(a) grants trial judges a considerable amount of
discretion in admitting expert testimony because these determina-
tions are not subject to the general rules of evidence. Furthermore,
Rule 104(a) suggests that judges may, in ruling on preliminary ques-
tions of admissibility, conduct their own independent factual investi-
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficent facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the uitness las applied the prindples and
methods reliably to the facts of the case
Id. at 459 (italics provided in source to indicate new material).
24 See generally FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note (providing general gui-
dance for interpreting Rule 702).
25 See FED. K. Evm. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible ....
26 FED. R. EvIn. 403.
27 FED. R. Evm. 104(a), (b).
2000]
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gations into the qualifications of an expert or the scientific reliability
of proffered expert testimony. However, although judges are not
bound by the rules of evidence in conducting pretrial Rule 104(a)
hearings, they are bound by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, which limit the extent to which judges
may acquire potentially prejudicial knowledge. 28
Presumably, Congress intended that tle Federal Rules of Evi-
dence would establish a clear and uniform test for federal courts to
apply in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.29 How-
ever, in the years following the passage of the Federal Rules, the
courts had a difficult time applying the Rule 702 framework. In par-
ticular, uncertainty remained regarding whether helpful but not gen-
erally accepted expert testimony constituted admissible evidence
under Rule 702.30
C. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In 1993, the Supreme Court clarified these matters in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.31 In Daubert, the plaintiffs sought to
recover damages for birth defects allegedly caused by their mothers'
use of the antinausea drug Bendectin during pregnancy.32 Granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of substantial scientific evidence
linking use of Bendectin to the plaintiffs' birth defects.5 3 Noting that
the Ninth Circuit previously adopted the general acceptance test for
scientific evidence in United States v. Kilgvs,3 4 the district court held
that the opinions of the plaintiffs' experts, which were based on in
vitro studies, chemical structure analyses, and animal studies, were not
admissible because such techniques had not achieved general accept-
ance in their respective field.35
28 See infra Part II.B.
29 See FED. R. EVID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and de-
velopment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.").
30 See, e.g., United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536-37 (l1th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237-40 (3d Cir. 1985).
31 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
32 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
33 See id. at 575-76.
34 See id. at 572 (citing United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)).
35 See id. at 575 (noting that "federal courts have held that epidemiological studies are
the most reliable evidence of causation in this area," and holding that "expert opinion
which is not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish causation
because it lacks the sufficient foundation necessary under FRE 703").
[Vol. 86:167176
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed.3 6 Voicing support for the district court's use of the general
acceptance standard, the Ninth Circuit stressed that recognized au-
thorities in the field must generally accept the scientific methodolo-
gies an expert employs.3 7 The Ninth Circuit explained that if a court
does not find the underlying methodologies to be "'generally ac-
cepted as a reliable technique,'" the court must exclude the proffered
testimony.38 Unsatisfied with this reasoning which was arguably in-
consistent with Rule 702, the plaintiffs sought review by the Supreme
Court on the question of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence su-
perseded F"ye and thus required the district court to conduct a differ-
ent admissibility determination.3 9 In 1993 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.40
In specifically addressing whether the Federal Rules of Evidence
superseded Frye, the Supreme Court concluded that
'[g] eneral acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
but the Rules of Evidence-especially Rule 702-do assign the trial
judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.41
Greatly expanding the trial judge's traditional role, the Court held
that the trial judge must assess whether "the reasoning or methodol-
ogy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue."42 All nine Justices agreed that the Rules of Evidence super-
36 SeeDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128-31, 1128 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
-37 See id. at 1130.
38 Id. (quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985)). The
plaintiffi argued that their experts' reanal)sis of published studies was a generally accepted
scientific technique. See i& The Nimth Circuit held that reanalyses must be subjected to
verification and scrutiny by others in the field. See id. at 1131. The court concluded,
"[p]laintiffi' reanalyses do not comply with this standard; they were unpublished, not sub-
jected to the normal peer review process and generated solely for use in litigation." Id.
39 SeePetition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-17, Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102).
40 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 506 U.S. 914 (1992).
41 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Although Daubert
requires all federal courts to abandon Fye, many states have adhered to the rigid Fr stan-
dard. See, e.g., State v. Isley, 936 P.2d 275, 279 (Ran. 1997) (holding that general accept-
ance test set forth in Frye governs admissibility of expert scientific evidence in Kansas
courts); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1315 (Wash. 1996) (holding that Fre is the
applicable test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321,
327 (Cal. 1994) (reaffirming the use of the general acceptance test for eidence based on
"new scientific techniques"); State v. Carter, 524 NA.2d 763, 777-79 (Neb. 1994) (holding
that the Fiye test, rather than Dauber4 applies to admission of novel forensic eidence),
ovemed by State v. Freeman, 571 N.AV.2d 276 (Neb. 1997).
42 Dauber4 509 U.S. at 592-93.
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seded Frye and that the lower courts improperly applied the general
acceptance standard as the exclusive test for deciding whether to ad-
mit the plaintiffs' expert testimony.43 However, the Court split seven-
to-two on the question of how trial judges should apply this newly for-
mulated "scientific knowledge" standard.44
Emphasizing that under the Federal Rules of Evidence trial
judges must act as gatekeepers, admitting only expert testimony which
qualifies as "scientific knowledge," the Court set forth four factors that
trial judges may wish to consider: (1) whether a theory or technique
can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error of a particular technique; and (4) whether the
theory has been generally accepted.45 Departing from the rigid Fye
test, the Court emphasized that "the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is
... a flexible one" and that "the focus, of course, must be solely on
43 See id. at 589, 598.
44 See id. at 580, 598-601. In attempting to clarify what constitutes "scientific knowl-
edge" under Rule 702, the majority stated that "the adjective 'scientific' implies a ground-
ing in the methods and procedures of science" and "the word 'knowledge' connotes more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Id. at 589-90. Furthermore, the major-
ity noted that "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must
be derived by the scientific method" and that "[p]roposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known." Id. at 590. Hiow-
ever, Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Stevens joined, concurring in pat and
dissenting in part, questioned the majority's application of this "scientific knowledge"
standard:
Does all of this dicta [surrounding "scientific knowledge"] apply to an ex-
pert seeking to testify on the basis of "technical or other specialized knowl-
edge"--the other types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies-or
are the "general observations" limited only to "scientific knowledge"? What
is the difference between scientific knowledge and technical knowledge;
does Rule 702 actually contemplate that the phrase "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge" be broken down into numerous subspecies of
expertise, or did its authors simply pick general descriptive language cover-
ing the sort of expert testimony which courts have customarily received?
Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 See id. at 593-95. In addition to the four criteria set forth in Daubert, other courts
have suggested additional factors that trial judges may consider in assessing the reliability
of expert testimony. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317
(9th Cir.) (adding on remand: whether the experts are "proposing to testify about matters
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the
litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testify-
ing"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997) (whether there is "simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered."); Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.)
(whether the expert "is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work
outside his paid litigation consulting"), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1104 (1997); Claar v. Burling-
ton N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) (whether the expert has sufficiently
explained the reasoning and methods underlying his conclusions); Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1209 (6th Cir. 1988) (whether the expertjustified his dismis-
sal of other experts' differing opinions).
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principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."46
Vacating the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the Court remanded the case,
instructing the Court of Appeals that general acceptance is no longer
a necessary precondition to the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony.47
While the gatekeeping role the Court defined in Daubert received
praise from those who saw the decision as an opportunity to mend the
increasingly hostile relationship between law and science,48 others
cautioned that trial judges, many of whom have no formal scientific
training, simply lack the ability to undertake such complex and
searching inquiries into the merits of expert scientific testimony.49 As
evidenced by many post-Daubert decisions, the courts had a difficult
46 Daubert 509 U.S. at 594, 595. In conclusion, the majority addressed two of the
parties' underlying concerns in Dauberl First, in response to the defendant's concern that
abandonment of the Fyestandard would result in a "'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries
are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions," the Court stressed
that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruc-
tion on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence." Id at 595-96. Second, in response to the plaintiffs' concern that
the exclusion of some scientific evidence would stifle the search for the truth, the Court
emphasized that although the gatekeeping role on occasion may prevent the use of novel
scientific theories, "the balance that is struck by [the] Rules of Evidence [is] designed not
for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of
legal disputes." Id. at 597.
47 See i& at 597-98. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit again
affirmed the district court's grant of summaryjudgment for the defendant. See Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995).
Discussing the plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the first prong of Rule 702 which requires the
party to demonstrate that the expert has utilized scientifically valid and reliable methodol-
ogies, the Ninth Circuit held that although "plaintiffs' experts have relied on animal stud-
ies, chemical structure analyses and epidemiological data, they neither explain the
methodology the experts followed to reach their conclusions nor point to any external
source to validate that methodology." Id. at 1319. As for the second prong of the Rule 702
inquiry under Dauber the Ninth Circuit undertook an analysis of whether the plaintiffs'
proffered testimony would assist the trier of fact in resolving the dispute over the link
between Bendectin use and birth defects. Applying California tort law, the Ninth Circuit
noted that "plaintiffs' experts would have had to testify either that Bendectin actually
caused plaintif' injuries (which they could not say) or that Bendectin more than doubled
the likelihood of limb reduction birth defects (which they did not say)." Id. at 1322. The
court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet the relevancy prong of the Rule 702
inquiry under DauberL See id.
48 See, eg., Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Walke ofDaubert: A New &arch for
Scentifie Knowedge, 72 TEx. L Rxv. 715, 802 (1994) (expressing optimism that "the search
for scientific knowledge launched by Daubert 'ill bring [law and science] into closer
accord").
49 See, eg., Dauber; 43 F.3d at 1315-17. On remand from the Supreme Court, United
States CircuitJudge Kozinski prefaced the Ninth Circuit's analysis ofDauberiwith a caution-
ary and eloquent examination of the court's concerns regarding the new "gatekeeping"
role. In section II(A) of the court's opinion entitled "Brave New World," Judge Kozinsli
noted that"[flederaljudges ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony face a
far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before." Id. at 1315.
Noting that judges are "largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the
witnesses whose testimony audges] are reviewing,"Judge Kozinski described the gatekeep-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
time interpreting and applying the gatekeeping mandate in an appro-
priate and consistent fashion.50 Many unanswered questions re-
mained regarding the extent to which trial judges could weigh
competing scientific theories, the proper standard under which an ap-
peals court could reverse a district court's admissibility determination,
and the lengths to which judges could go in conducting their own
scientific research to comprehend the complex scientific matters ap-
pearing before them.
D. General Electric Co. v. Joiner
In General Electric Co. v.Joiner,51 the Supreme Court revisited some
of these critical, unanswered questions. In Joiner, the plaintiffs, Robert
Joiner and his wife, sought damages for Joiner's lung cancer that was
allegedly caused by his on-the-job exposure to polychlorinated biphe-
nyls (PCBs).52 In support of their claims, the plaintiffs proffered testi-
mony of two experts who opined that Joiner's exposure to PCB9,
furans, and dioxins caused his lung cancer.5 3 Although the district
court held that "there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whetherJoiner had been exposed to PCBs," the court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment for the following reasons:
(1) there was no genuine issue as to whether [he] had been ex-
posed to furans and dioxins, and (2) the testimony of [his] experts
had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PGB's
and small-cell lung cancer [and was therefore inadmissible because
ing role in a tone that revealed his own doubts about the competency of the federaljudici-
my to perform such a demanding role:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court's
opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists
about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas where there is no
scientific consensus as to what is and what is not 'good science,' and occa-
sionally to reject such expert testimony because it was not 'derived by the
scientific method.'
Id. at 1316 (referring to the Supreme Court's test); see also David L. Faigman et al., C/hech
Your Cystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and
Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 GARwozo L. REv. 1799, 1834-35 (1994)
(suggesting that the task of conducting a "rigorous and thorough analysis of scientific data"
is "made difficult because of the general lack of scientific literacy among Americans, in-
cluding lawyers and judges"); Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 2, at 326 ("Most judges lack the
basic training and experience that is necessary for evaluating scientific opinions, and their
individual level of scientific competence varies.").
50 See Kesan, supra note 17, at 2014, 2006-2018 (observing that such efforts by trial
judges to reconcile genuine scientific disagreements has resulted in "a tortured landscape
of [post-Daubert] decisions," which are nonuniform, inconsistent, and irreconcilable).
51 522 U.S. 136 (1997). The Court refers to the plaintiffs in the singular. Id. at 139
n.1.
52 SeeJoiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F.Supp. 1310, 1311-14 (N.D. Ga. 1994), revtd, 78
F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), reu'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
53 See id. at 1317-22.
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it] did not rise above 'subjective belief or unsupported
speculation.' 54
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court im-
properly assumed the role of the fact finder in weighing the plaintiffs'
scientific evidence rather than simply assessing the scientific validity of
the methodologies employed by the plaintiffs' experts.*5 Reiterating
the Court's cautionary advice in Daubert that judges must focus
"solely"56 on methodologies and not conclusions,5 7 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit emphasized that the judge's role as gatekeeper is to "assure that
an expert's opinions are based on relevant scientific methods,
processes, and data, and not on mere speculation, and that they apply
to the facts in issue." s58
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit on
the basis that the appellate court applied an improper standard of
review.59 Contrary to the Court's previous holding in Daubert which
stated that "the focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate,"Go ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist expressed the new view that:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another.... A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap betveen the data and the opinion proffered ....
That is what the District Court did here, and we hold that it did not
abuse its discretion in so doing.6 1
By approving the district court's exclusion of the plaintiffs' expert tes-
timony on the basis of improperly drawn conclusions, the Court in
Joinerbroadened the scope of the judicial gatekeeping role to include
-4 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140.
55 SeeJoinerv. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524,533-34 (11th Cir. 1996) rev'd, 522 U.S. 136
(1997). The court explained:
ITihe gatekeeping responsibility of the trial courts is not to weigh or
choose between conflicting scientific opinions, or to analyze and study the
science in question in order to reach its own scientific conclusions from the
material in the field. Rather, it is to assure that an expert's opinions are
based on relevant scientific methods, processes, and data, and not on mere
speculation, and that they apply to the facts in issue.
Id. at 530.
56 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
57 See Kenneth J. Chesebro, TakingDaubert0 "Focus" Sfiously: The Mcthodool/Conclu.
sionDistinction, 15 CRiozo L REV. 1745, 1748 (1994) (noting "the clear distinction drawm
in Daubert between an expert's methodology and conclusion" and arguing that "it is com-
pletely inappropriate for either the proponent of scientific testimony or her opponent to
advance Rule 702 admissibility arguments that depend on the ultimate conclusion reached
by an expert").
58 Joiner, 78 F.3d at 530.
59 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141 (holding that "abuse of discretion is the proper standard
of review of a district court's evidentiary rulings").
60 Daube, 509 U.S. at 595.
61 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (citations omitted).
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the requirement that trial judges evaluate the analytical reasoning em-
ployed by scientific experts.62
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Joiner contains additional
evidence of the Court's expansion of the gatekeeping role.63 While
Justice Breyer reiterated the concerns of amici that judges lack scien-
tific training, he stressed that "neither the difficulty of the task nor any
comparative lack of expertise can excuse the judge from exercising
the 'gatekeeper' duties that the Federal Rules impose. "64 Although
neither Daubert nor joiner specifically addressed the means by which
judges may overcome the difficulties posed by complex admissibility
determinations, Justice Breyer noted in his concurring opinion that
judges may utilize techniques found in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and Civil Procedure such as pretrial conferences, pretrial hearings,
and the appointment of special masters and specially trained law
clerks. 65 Justice Breyer suggested further that judges may wish to rely
upon the assistance of reputable court-appointed experts "recom-
mended to courts by established scientific organizations, such as the
National Academy of Sciences or the American Association for the
Advancement of Science."66 However, as judges faced with complex
admissibility determinations begin to rely upon such tools, they will
find little guidance in Daubert andjoinerregarding the extent to which
they may acquire case-specific scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge through those means. Furthermore, the Court's latest
statement on the admissibility of expert testimony in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichae 67 further compounds these ambiguities.
E. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
Kumho represents the latest and most significant expansion of the
judicial gatekeeping role since Joiner. In Kumho, the plaintiffs, who
sustained injuries when one of the tires on their vehicle failed, sued
the tire manufacturer and distributor, basing their claim primarily
upon the testimony of an expert in tire failure analysis. 68 At issue in
the case was whether the district court properly excluded the testi-
62 See id. ("[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert.").
63 See id. at 147-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring).
65 See id. at 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae The New England
Journal of Medicine and Marcia Angell at 18-19, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997)).
67 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
68 See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1516-17 (S.D. Ala. 1996),
rev'd, 131 F.3d 1433 (lth Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nain. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999).
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mony of the plaintiffs' tire expert on the grounds that his methodol-
ogy failed the reliability requirement set forth by Rule 702 and
Daubert, even though his testimony was "technical" rather than "scien-
tific." 69 Reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed
with the district court's decision to exclude the expert testimony and
held that Dauberts gatekeeping duties apply not only to scientific testi-
mony but to all expert testimony including "technical" and "other spe-
cialized" knowledge as referred to in Rule 702.70
Not only did the Court expand the gatekeeping role by requiring
judges to determine the relevancy and reliability of all expert testi-
mony, but the Court also concluded that "the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about
determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable."71 Some
commentators have argued that, by adding this grant of "considerable
leeway" to the already broad authority of judges to conduct pretrial
hearings under Rule 104(a), 72 district judges now possess nearly un-
limited discretion in selecting the criteria to be used in determining
the admissibility of proffered scientific, technical, and other special-
ized expert testimony on a case-by-case basis.73 Furthermore, in defin-
ing the trial judge's role in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony, the Court failed to establish specific prohibitions on self-
initiated factual inquiries. A close examination of the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges and 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, however, reveals
that these authorities contain general provisions intended to preserve
the integrity of the adversarial system, to prohibit independent factual
investigations, and to ensure that judges remain impartial and
unbiased.
69 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
70 Id. at 141-42, 147.
71 Id. at 152.
72 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
73 See, eg., K. Issac deVyver, Opening the Door But KeepingtheLights Off. Kumho The Co.
v. Carmichael and the App ability oftheDaubert Test toNonsdenificEtidence, 50 CQsnAV. Rzs.
L Rv. 177, 202 (1999) (noting that because Kumho permits each judge to employ his own
admissibility criteria, this will lead "to a variance among the federal circuits and a lack of
predictability for litigants"); William H. Latham, The 'Gatcxpers'Dis ertion:"TFxibe Stan-
dards on Admissibility ofExpert Evidence in Make ofKumho, S.C. Lvwmn, Aug. 11, 1999, at 15,
19 (suggesting that more discretion afforded to judges by Kumho"means more uncertainty
for litigants and more 'wiggle room' for use by zealous advocates in arguing both for and
against the admissibility of particular expert testimony").
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II
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF T=E CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES AND 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 & 455-THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION STATUTES
A. The Need for Judicial Codes of Conduct
In the wake of the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trilogy, federal judges are
playing an increasingly important role in determining the admissibil-
ity of expert evidence in a wide range of complex science- and tech-
nology-based lawsuits.74  Although critics of the post-Kumho
gatekeeping role continue to question the validity of admissibility de-
terminations on the basis that generalist trial judges lack the requisite
scientific and technical literacy to enter sound judgments,7- the valid-
ity of a court's judgments rests on factors other than the scientific
competence of the presidingjudge. As United States Supreme Court
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy stated:
Respect for a judgment depends upon its coherence, its logic, its
intellectual force, its fairness, its common sense, its roots in ancient
principles of law and justice, and its continued vitality in a world of
change .... [However,] [a] court's judgments will be given no
serious consideration, no examination at all, if the public is not con-
fident that its judges remain committed to neutral and principled
rules for the conduct of their office. 76
If, as Justice Kennedy suggests, the validity of a court's judgments is
based upon the public's confidence in an independent and impartial
judiciary, efforts by judges to validate their decisions by improving
their own scientific literacy through extrajudicial sources may compro-
mise the values that form the basis of our judicial system. Thus, if the
federal judiciary is to establish and maintain its independence, judges
must follow a code of ethics that will foster justice and the rule of
law.77 In some cases, however, this judicial restraint may in fact hin-
74 See Faust F. Rossi, Expert Witnesses: Daubert v. Merrell Dour Before and After 82
(Sept. 16, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
75 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76 Anthony M. Kennedy, Judicial Ethics and the Rule of Law, 40 ST. Louis U. LJ. 1067,
1067 (1996).
77 See id. at 1067-68. Justice Kennedy offers three important principles to guide the
judiciary in order to preserve its independence:
First, judges must honor, always, a personal commitment to adhere to high
standards of ethical conduct in the performance of their official duties and
in their personal and social relations; second, thejudiciary itself must adopt
and announce specific, written codes of conduct to guide judges in the
performance of their duties; and third, there should be adequate mecha-
nisms and procedures for the judiciary itself to receive and investigate alle-
gations of misconduct and to take action where warranted, so that the
public has full assurance that its interest in an ethical judiciary is enforced
and secured.
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derjudges in their effort to reach "correct" decisions. Yet that is the
balance sought between outcome and process values in an adversarial
system.
B. Existing Limits to Judicial Scientific, Technical, and Other
Specialized Fact-Finding
1. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges
The Judicial Conference of the United States originally adopted
the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the "Code") on April 5,
1973.78 The basis for the Code was the ABA Model Code offiudicial Con-
duct (the "Model Code")79 the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association promulgated on August 16, 1972.80 The American Bar As-
sociation intended the Model Code to serve as a guide to assistjudges in
establishing and maintaining high ethical standards in their public
and private lives.8 ' The Model Code consists of five broadly stated Ca-
nons that each contain specific rules, -2 a terminology section, an ap-
plication section, and commentary.83 In the Model Code's preamble,
the drafters specifically noted that the Canons should serve to bind
judges to certain modes of conduct and that a judge's misconduct
may qualify for disciplinary action in certain circumstances depending
on the transgression's seriousness, on the improper activity's effects
on others and on the judicial system, and on the extent to which the
transgression falls into a pattern of improper activity.8 4 Although the
Model Code itself is not authoritative, forty-seven states and the District
of Columbia have adopted their own judicial conduct codes using the
ABA Model Code as a template.8 5 The Code of Conduct for United States
Judges also parallels and reflects the ABA Model Code.86
78 CODE OF CONDuCr, supra note 12; see id. at 1 n.1.
79 See Kennedy, supra note 76, at 1073.
80 AeaaucAN BAR ASS'N, ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL Co,'Dcr (1997).
81 See id. at 2.
82 See id. at 5-30. The five Canons of the ABA Model Code ofJudicial Conduct are as
follows:
Canon 1: "AJudge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciay"
ik. at 5;
Canon 2: "AJudge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in
All of the Judge's Activities," id.;
Canon 3: "A judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Dili-
gently," .at 8;
Canon 4: "AJudge Shall So Conduct the Judge's Extra-Judicial Activities as to Mini-
mize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Obligations," id. at 15; and
Canon 5: "AJudge orJudicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political
Activity," i. at 24.
83 See i& passim.
84 See i& at 1.
85 See Kennedy, supra note 76, at 1073.
86 See CODE OF CONDuca, supra note 12. The seven Canons of the Code of Conduct
are as follows:
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When read in light of the DaubertJoiner-Kumho trilogy, the Code
has far reaching implications for the application of the gatekeeping
role.8 7 Although the Code does not specifically address every ethical
dilemma that judges may encounter in performing their gatekeeping
duties, its teachings encourage judicial preservation of the federal ju-
diciary's integrity and independence. While the Code contains lan-
guage similar to that of the Model Code regarding possible disciplinary
action subsequent to violations, the Code further states that "[m] any of
the proscriptions in the Code are necessarily cast in general terms,
and it is not suggested that disciplinary action is appropriate where rea-
sonable judges might be uncertain as to whether or not the conduct is pro-
scribed."88 Thus, the Code's spirit is that its Canons are merely advisory
in nature, and a judge will not necessarily incur sanctions for
noncompliance.8 9
Canon 1 of the Code sets forth the basic ethical values underlying
its promulgation:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice
in our society. Ajudge should participate in establishing, maintain-
ing, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and should person-
ally observe those standards, so that the integrity and independence
of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code
should be construed and applied to further that objective.90
Canon 2 further emphasizes the need for judges to avoid impro-
priety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their public and
private activities:
Canon 1: "AJudge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of theJudciary,"
id. at 2;
Canon 2: "AJudge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in
All Activities," id. at 3;
Canon 3: "A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Impartially and Dili-
gently," id. at 5;
Canon 4: "AJudge May Engage in Extra-Judicial Activities to Improve the Law, the
Legal System, and the Administration ofJustice," id. at 12;
Canon 5: "AJudge Should Regulate Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of
Conflict with Judicial Duties," id. at 13;
Canon 6: "A Judge Should Regularly File Reports of Compensation Received for
Law-Related and Extra-Judicial Activities," id. at 18; and
Canon 7: "AJudge Should Refrain From Political Activity," id. at 19.
87 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges governs the conduct of United States
circuitjudges, districtjudges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims
judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. See id. at 1. In addition, certain provi-
sions of the Code apply to special masters and commissioners, as the introduction indicates.
See id. An interesting point is that the Code does not apply to Supreme Court Justices.
88 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
89 SeeKennedy, supra note 76, at 1073.Justice Kennedy notes that "[a]Ithough compli-
ance with the Code is not mandatory, almost all federal judges are most diligent in con-
forming their conduct to its provisions" and that "[o]urjudges want to follow high ethical
standards, and they regard the Code as an appropriate and essential guide." Id.
90 CODE OF CoNUcr, supra note 12, at 2.
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A. Ajudge should respect and comply with the law and should act
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. Ajudge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should not lend
the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of
others; nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.91
Although one might argue that under Rule 104(a), ajudge's self-initi-
ated factual inquiries into an expert's qualifications or the founda-
tions of proffered testimony are not improper, Canon 2 emphasizes
the need forjudges to avoid the appearance of impropriety. The com-
mentary following Canon 2(A) specifically notes that "[t]he test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in
reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances
that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that the judge's
ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality,
and competence is impaired."92 Thus, when reasonable minds may
disagree over whether ajudge's sua sponte, exparte acquisition of scien-
tific evidence creates an appearance of impropriety, Canon 2 proscribes
this type of behavior.
In addition, whereas Canon 3 promotes judicial competence, it
also addresses the general limits on judges in the performance of their
judicial duties, which include those tasks that the Court set forth in
the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trilogy. Canon 3(A) (1) emphasizes the need
for judges to maintain competency in the law, stating that "[a] judge
should be faithful to and maintain professional competence in the
law, and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or
fear of criticism." 93 Although some commentators contend that this
professional competence requires judges to acquire a sufficient level
of scientific literacy by way of extrajudicial sources, Canon 3(A) (4)
sets limits on the means by which judges may acquire such potentially
prejudicial knowledge:
Ajudge should accord to every person who is legally interested in. a
proceeding, or the person's lawyer, full right to be heard according
to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor con-
sider ex parte communications on the merits, or procedures affect-
ing the merits, of a pending or impending proceeding. A judge
may, however, obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law
applicable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice
to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the ad-
vice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. A
91 Id. at3.
92 d.
93 Id. at5.
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judge may, with consent of the parties, confer separately with the
parties and their counsel in an effort to mediate or settle pending
matters.94
Furthermore, Canon 3(C) sets forth the requisite bases for ajudge's
disqualification:
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances in which:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding .... 95
Recalling the Code's advisory nature, judges will not face sanctions for
noncompliance with Canon 3 (C). However, parts of the Code's philos-
ophy appear in specific federal statutes and, in these instances, judges
must comply with the specific statutory guidelines.9 6
Although the Code's first three Canons deal primarily with a
judge's official duties, Canons 4 and 5 address the extent to which
judges may participate in extrajudicial activities.97 Whereas Canon 4
encourages judges to "engage in extrajudicial activities to improve
the law, the legal system, and the administration ofjustice,"9° Canon 5
"regulate Es] extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict
with judicial duties."99 Thus, it is clear that the Codes framers wrestled
with the challenge of reconciling two competing visions concerning
the extent to which judges may engage in extrajudicial activities. On
the one hand, Canon 4 encourages judges to engage in intellectual
endeavors related to their profession and to interact with colleagues
on a constructive basis. Yet, on the other hand, Canon 5 reveals that
94 Id. at 6. The commentary concerning Canon 3(A) (4) notes the following:
The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding in-
cludes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who
are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permit-
ted. It does not preclude a judge from consulting with other judges, or
with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out
adjudicative responsibilities. Ajudge should make reasonable efforts to en-
sure that this provision is not violated through law clerks or other staff
personnel.
An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain the
advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite the expert to file a
brief amicus-curiae.
Id- at 9.
95 Id. at 7. For a more detailed treatment of Canon 3(C), see LEsuE W. AwwAiSON,
JUDIcIAL DISQUAIrCATON UNDER CANON 3 OF ThE CODE OFJJUDICIAL CONDUar 5-11 (Am.
Judicature Soc'y, 2d ed. 1992).
96 See Kennedy, supra note 76, at 1073; see, e.g., infra note 105 and accompanying text
(discussing and setting forth the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994)).
97 See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 12, at 12-18.
98 Id. at 12.
99 Id. at 13.
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such scholarly pursuits must not extend so far as to hinder a judge's
ability to apply legal principles on an impartial basis.
Although Canon 5 establishes general guidelines regarding par-
ticipation in extrajudicial activities, there is little guidance regarding
the appropriateness of ajudge's participation in any of the many pub-
licly and privately sponsored, law-related activities available today. For
example, Canon 4 permits judges to "speak, write, lecture, teach, and
participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice," provided that "in doing so [they) do
not cast reasonable doubt on [their] capacity to decide impartially any
issue[s] that may come before [them]. " 100 However, the "reasonable
doubt" standard is ambiguous in the context ofjudicial gatekeeping.
For example, if a judge attends a conference on asbestos-related dis-
eases and must later determine the admissibility of expert testimony
in an asbestos case, might a reasonable person doubt the judge's ca-
pacity to perform his gatekeeping duties impartially?
Finally, Canon 6 addresses issues surrounding the receipt of com-
pensation for extrajudicial activities.101 Canon 6 is highly relevant to-
day, because many judges obtain reimbursement for travel expenses
and accommodations that they incur through attendance and partici-
pation at judicial seminars and conferences. In particular, the Canon
provides that:
Ajudge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses
for the law-related and extrajudicial activities permitted by this
Code, if the source of such payments does not give the appearance
of influencing the judge in the judge's judicial duties or otherwise
give the appearance of impropriety, subject to the following
restrictions:
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a reasona-
ble amount nor should it exceed what a person who is not a
judge would receive for the same activity.
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be
limited to the actual costs of travel, food, and lodging reasona-
bly incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occa-
sion, by the judge's spouse or relative. Any payment in excess of
such an amount is compensation.
100 Id. at 12. The commentary following Canon 4 provides significant insight into the
fundamental values underlying the promulgation of this liberal and proactive Canon:
As ajudicial officer and person specially learned in the law, ajudge is in a
unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal sys-
tern, and the administration ofjustice, including revision of substantive and
procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the
extent that the judge's time permits, the judge is encouraged to do so, ei-
ther independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or
other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.
Id. at 12-13.
101 See id. at 18.
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C. Public Reports. Ajudge should make required financial dis-
closures in compliance with applicable statutes and Judicial
Conference regulations and directives.' 0 2
While the Code provides general guidelines for the behavior of federal
judges, the federal judicial disqualification statutes-28 U.S.C. §§ 144
and 455-provide more specific guidelines for the disqualification of
judges whose extrajudicial activities may adversely affect their ability to
remain impartial.
2. The Federal Judicial Disqualification Statutes-28 U.S.C. §§ 144
& 455
Congress codified the spirit of Canon 3 (C) in 1974 when it broad-
ened and clarified the standards for disqualifying federal judges, Jus-
tices, and magistrates for prejudice or bias.10 3 Section 144 of title 28
of the United States Code provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding. 0 4
Section 455 of title 28 of the United States Code similarly provides:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall dis-
qualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding .... 105
102 Id.
103 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994). Congress amended § 455 in 1974. See Act of Dec. 5,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455). As re-
vealed by the legislative history of the statute, the fundamental purpose behind the amend-
ment was to "broaden and clarify the grounds for judicial disqualification" in order "to
promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process." H.R. REP. No. 93-
1453, at 1, 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 6351, 6351, 6355.
104 28 U.S.C. § 144.
105 Id. § 455. Under § 455, counsel for a party who questions the presiding judge's
impartiality has an ethical obligation to raise the issue. See Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842,
847 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit in Bernard stated:
Counsel for a party who believes ajudge's impartiality is reasonably subject
to question has not only a professional duty to his client to raise the matter,
but an independent responsibility as an officer of the court. ... A lawyer
who reasonably believes that the judge before whom he is appearing should
not sit must raise the issue so it may be confronted and put to rest. Any
other course would risk undermining public confidence in our judicial
system.
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Although Congress broadened the scope of the federal judicial dis-
qualification statutes, many commentators have suggested that the
standards for judicial disqualification remain ambiguous and that as a
result the public has lost confidence in the impartiality and indepen-
dence of the judicial process.10 6 Furthermore, the unsettling reality of
disqualification proceedings under §§ 144 and 455 is that a party's
motion for disqualification must ultimately be decided by the very
judge whose impartiality is at issue. 0 7
As evidenced by the recent federal cases addressing § 455 issues,
the courts have applied different tests to determine whether judicial
disqualification is appropriate. For example, in Edgar v. KL.,10 3 a
class action suit questioning the constitutionality of the Illinois mental
health care system, the parties consented to the appointment of a
panel of three experts by the district judge to investigate and report
on the institutions and programs in question.1°9 While the panel was
permitted to meet with patients and state employees outside the pres-
ence of counsel, the defendants claimed that the parties did not con-
sent to private meetings between the judge and the panel when there
was no compelling reason." 0 Upon discovering that the panel met
106 See eg., Comment, DisqualifingFederalJudgesforBias A Consideration ofthe Extrajudi-
cial Bias Limitation forDisqualification Under 28 U.S.C § 455(a), 24 SErro HU.L L REv. 2057,
2057 & n.5 (1994); see also, eg., Seth E. Bloom,Judidal Bias and FinandalInterest as Grounds
for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CGAsE W. R!s. L REv. 662, 694-97 (1985) (criticizing
the judicial approach tojudicial bias disqualification for being overly rigid and thus failing
to accommodate the conflicting values of impartiality and efficiency); Ed%ard G. Burg
Comment, Meeting the Chalenge: RethinkingJudicial Disquahftication, 69 Cu.. L REv. 1445,
1481-82 (1981) (rejecting "rigid and inconsistent" bias rules for a "more flexible approach"
which would disqualify ajudge for bias on only one ground: reasonable belief of a party);
Mark T. Coberly, Comment, Caesar's IVfe Revisited-udicial Disqualfiadion Arie" the 1974
Amendments 34 WASH. &-- LEE L REv. 1201, 1201-1202 (1977) (favoring the then-present
statutory scheme, 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, for federal judicial disqualification); Note,
Disqualification ofJudges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HArt\. L RE%. 736, 764 (1973)
("Since the authority of the judiciary is dependent on public confidence in the impersonal-
ity and reasoned foundation ofjudicial decisions, it is essential that judges be disqualified
whenever the public may reasonably question their impartiality."); Susan B. Hoekema,
Comment, Questioning the Impartiality ofJudges: DisqualiingFederaLDistd CourtJdges Under
28 U.S.C § 455(a), 60 TLMi'. LQ. 697, 735-36 (1987) (proposing more objective standard
forjudicial bias disqualification because courts have not faithfully applied current objective
standard); Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or
Prejudice, 46 U. Cm. L REv. 236, 267 (1978) (recognizing "the need for ajudicial system
that not only is impartial in fact, but also appears to render disinterested justice").
107 See Benard, 31 F.3d at 843 ("[The somewhat surprising (and not entirely comforta-
ble) reality is that the motion is addressed to, and must be decided by, the very judge
whose impartiality is being questioned."); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191,
1202-03 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Section 455 dearly contemplates that decisions iwith respect to
disqualification should be made by the judge sitting in the case, and not by another
judge.").
108 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
109 See id. at 257.
110 See id.
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privately with the judge on several occasions to present the judge with
a preview of their conclusions and to persuade him that their method-
ology was sound, the defendants moved for disqualification under
§ 455.111 The defendants argued that the panel imparted to the judge
"personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts" in violation of
§ 455(b) of the United States Code.112 Ruling on the motion, the judge
declined to disqualify himself, and the defendants petitioned the Sev-
enth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.' 3
The Seventh Circuit concluded that mandatory disqualification
under § 455(b) (1) was appropriate on the facts of the case, issued a
writ of mandamus to remove the district judge from the case, and re-
quired that the case be reassigned to a different judge.1 4 The court
noted that "[t]he discussions in chambers were calculated, material,
and wholly unnecessary" and that "[a] thoughtful observer aware of all
the facts... would conclude that a preview of evidence by a panel of
experts who had become partisans carries an unacceptable potential
for compromising impartiality."" 5 The trial judge argued that his
meetings with the panel were appropriate because "the meetings
would enable him to ensure that the panel's report was admissible" if
the parties later raised Daubert issues." 6 The Seventh Circuit rejected
the district judge's argument on the ground that the meetings com-
promised his impartiality."' 7 The appellate court also questioned the
judge's impartiality on the basis of his expressions of confidence in
the panel's report and his demands for significant concessions during
settlement negotiations (on behalf of the plaintiffs)." 8
In In re School Asbestos Litigation,119 the Third Circuit considered
whether a trial judge's attendance at a conference on asbestos-related
III See i
112 Id. at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted). In response to the defendant's mo-
tion, the plaintiffs argued that: (1) the parties consented to private meetings and (2) dis-
closures in chambers are not "personal" knowledge. See id.
113 See id. at 257.
114 See id. at 262.
115 Id. at 259, 259-60. To distinguish knowledge gained on-the-record in ajudicial ca-
pacity from personal knowledge gained off-the-record, the Seventh Circuit noted the dan-
gers that off-the-record briefings pose to the integrity of the adversarial process:
Off-the-record briefings in chambers... leave no trace in the record-and
in this case the judge has forbidden any attempt at reconstruction. What
information passed to the judge, and how reliable it may have been, are
now unknowable. This is "personal" knowledge no less than if the judge
had decided to take an undercover tour of a mental institution to see how
the patients were treated.
Id. at 259.
116 Id. at 260.
117 See i
118 See id.
19 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992). This was a class action suit involving asbestos in school
buildings. See id. at 769.
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diseases would lead "a reasonable person... [to] question the district
judge's continued impartiality."120 The plaintiffs in this case partially
funded the conference with $50,000 they obtained from a settlement
fund.' 2 ' The Third Circuit answered affirmatively and disqualified
the trial judge under § 455(a). The court summarized:
[H]e attended a predominantly pro-plaintiff conference on a key
merits issue; the conference was indirectly sponsored by the plain-
tiffs, largely with funding that he himself had approved; and his ex-
penses were largely defrayed by the conference sponsors with those
same court-approved funds. Moreover, he was, in his own words,
exposed to a Hollywood-style "pre-screening" of the plaintiffs' case:
thirteen of the eighteen expert witnesses the plaintiffs were in-
tending to call gave presentations very similar to what they expected
to say at trial.' 22
As the Third Circuit emphasized, the standard for disqualification
under § 455 (a) is not whether the judge actually harbors any illegiti-
mate pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias, but whether a reasonable
person might perceive bias to exist.123
While the Third Circuit based its decision to disqualify on § 455,
it also noted that Canon 3(C) of the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges would require the same result. 124 In light of this Note's previ-
ous discussion of the advisory nature of the Code, an examination of
the Third Circuit's reliance on the Code in its reasoning in In re School
Asbestos Litigation is revealing. While the court does not state that the
teachings of the Code are binding, several of the Judicial Conference's
advisory opinions on the Code guide its ruling in the case.' 25
In re School Asbestos Litigation and Edgar illustrate the effectiveness
of § 455 as a tool for policing the judiciary. However, not all cases
raising § 455 issues involve judicial acts as egregious as the ones wit-
nessed in In re School Asbestos Litigation and Edgar. In many instances, it
120 Id. at 781. The court stated that it was not necessary to "decide the more difficult
question whether subsection 455(b) (1) [which mandates disqualification on the basis of
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts] also required disqualification" because
the court had concluded that subsection 455(a) mandated disqualification on grounds of
partiality. Id.
121 See id at 779.
122 IR at 781-82.
123 See i& at 782; see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("Such a stringent
rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who w.ould do their
very best to weigh the scales ofjustice equally between contending parties. But to perform
its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice." (quoting
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
124 See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 783.
125 See id. at 783-84. For example, the court notes that Advisory Opinion No. 17 sug-
gests that if ajudge's lodging and travel expenses are paid for by an organization that is
known to advocate a viewpoint regularly advanced in litigation, the judge may be disquali-
fied for an appearance of impartiality and impropriety. See id.
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is difficult to determine whether the alleged bias or prejudice stems
from a prohibited extrajudicial source or is simply the result of per-
missible conduct arising in the course of judicial duties. These cases
pose the greatest challenge for courts and will continue to do so, espe-
cially in the wake of Kumho.
For example, in Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospital & Training
Schoo1 26 the plaintiffs moved to disqualify the trial judge on the basis
that his ex parte communications with a court-appointed expert com-
promised his impartiality.127 Judge Parker, the trial judge, found that
a reasonable person would not doubt his impartiality under the cir-
cumstances.' 28 Judge Parker noted further that under United States v.
Grinnell Corp.' 29 disqualification would be appropriate only if the
plaintiffs established that the alleged impartiality arose from an extra-
judicial source and resulted in a decision not based on the judge's
involvement in the case at hand. 30 Relying in part on a leading case
from the Sixth Circuit, Bradley v. Milliken,'31 the trial judge deter-
mined that his three telephone conversations with the court-ap-
pointed expert which were the subject of controversy arose in a strictly
judicial context and were therefore appropriate. 132
Similarly, in Bradley, a school desegregation case, the plaintiffs
sought to disqualify the trial judge under § 455 (a) on the grounds
that his exparte communication with court-appointed experts, commu-
nity groups, and representatives of the Detroit School Board adversely
affected his impartiality. 3 3 The Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge DeMas-
cio's decision not to recuse himself from the case, holding that his ex
parte communications took place in an official judicial context. 34 The
court stated that although Judge DeMascio's actions were "perhaps a
bit unorthodox," his "use of experts, or his receipt through them of
community and expert views on how best to approach the problems of
desegregating Detroit schools," did not require him to recuse him-
126 757 F. Supp. 1231 (D.N.M. 1990).
127 See id. at 1232.
128 See id. at 1240.
129 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
130 See Jackson, 757 F. Supp. at 1240.
131 620 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1980).
132 See Jackson, 757 F. Supp. at 1241. The plaintiffs in this case argued that the trial
judge should have provided the parties with at least one of the following: (1) a record
identifying the content of the conversations; (2) a formal stenographic transcript of the
conversations; or (3) an opportunity to actually be present during the conversations. See
id. at 1242. The judge, however, concluded that the plaintiffs waived their rights to seek
recusal under § 455(a) because they failed to file their motion for disqualification at the
time they learned of the facts that formed the basis of their motion. See id. at 1243.
133 See Bradley, 620 F.2d at 1156.
134 See id. at 1156-58.
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self.135 In fact, the court essentially commended Judge DeMascio for
his behavior in the case, reiterating District Judge Churchill's senti-
ments: "[T]he manner in which Judge Robert E. DeMascio has pre-
sided in this case has been exemplary and should command the
respect of the parties, counsel, the judiciary, and the public." 36
More recently, the Sixth Circuit revisited these issues in United
States v. Bonds.137 The plaintiffs in Bonds moved for the recusal of Cir-
cuit Judge Boggs who attended a scholarly conference on forensic
uses of DNA sponsored by the University of California at Riverside.Iss
Central to the underlying criminal proceedings was the issue of
whether DNA in the blood found at the crime scene matched the
DNA in the blood from the defendant. 3 9 The motion to disqualify
Judge Boggs included allegations that: (1) the chief scientist at the
FBI's DNA laboratory had, at the conference, inappropriately de-
fended his own testimony at the Frye hearing and the FBI's DNA meth-
ods generally;14° (2) the chief scientist had both rehashed his own Frye
hearing testimony and had presented to Judge Boggs and other at-
tendees at the conference new data that neither he nor any other
prosecution witness had presented in court at the Frye hearing; 4 (3)
the chief scientist's presentations at the conference subjected Judge
Boggs to "substantial, detailed, and continuous extrajudicial informa-
tion of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the actual Fye hear-
ing"; 42 (4) Judge Boggs was seen "engaged in informal discussion
with [the chief scientist] and other members of the FBI laboratory
during the course of the conference";"4 (5) the atmosphere at the
conference was one-sided and "vituperative";144 and (6) "there were a
number of ad hominem attacks, many during the formal talks, that
were directed at [plaintiffs' counsel], by FBI employees and
prosecutors." 145
135 I& at 1157-58. Unlike the court in Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospital & TrainingStoo,
757 F. Supp. 1231 (D.N.L 1990), the Sixth Circuit in Bradley shared the plaintiffs' concern
that the reports of the experts with whom the judge consulted were not made part of the
record. The Sixth Circuit court directed that "if any experts are employed to ad%ise the
district court on any further matters in this litigation, they shall prepare written reports,
copies of which shall become part of the record and shall be made available to all parties
or their attorneys." Bradley, 620 F.2d at 1158.
136 Id. at 1158 (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 426 F. Supp. 929, 944 (E.D. Mich. 1977)).
137 18 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 1994).
138 See id. at 1328-29.
139 See id. at 1328.
140 See id. at 1329.
141 Id.
142 Id
143 Id
144 Id
145 Id.
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Judge Boggs nevertheless refused to recuse himself, stating that
"none of the material presented at the conference . . . constituted
extra-judicial knowledge of disputed facts."1 46 Though the judge ac-
knowledged that the conference may have "amounted to an attempt
... to 'spin' facts and evidence which... had already been frozen into
the record," he maintained that his attendance at the conference was
indistinguishable from "what occurs when an appellate judge reads
newspaper articles, magazines, or books that may relate to a case that
may come before him." 147 Yet Judge Boggs, whose own perception
was that all viewpoints were equally represented at the conference,
admitted that "the perceptions of others could differ."14 Under
§ 455 and the standard set forth in In re School Asbestos Litigation, a
perception of one-sidedness would require the disqualification of
Judge Boggs from the case because this perception, by definition, in-
dicated that the judge's attendance compromised the appearance of
impartiality.
Judge Boggs, perhaps in anticipation of this criticism, sought to
distinguish his situation from the trial judge's conference attendance
in In re School Asbestos Litigation. He wrote that in this case, a major
state university had sponsored the DNA conference and that he him-
self was not involved in funding or organizing the conference. 149 In
further defense of his participation in the conference, Judge Boggs
reiterated that a judge does not violate § 455 by hearing or reading
commentary on what is already in the record. 50
III
THE INTERSECTION OF THE POsT-KumHo GATEKEEPING ROLE
WITH THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND FEDERAL
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION STATUTES
As evidenced by Bradley, Jackson, and Bonds, the three leading
cases in which courts have rejected § 455(a) challenges, the courts are
generally reluctant to disqualify judges on the basis of ex parte commu-
nications and self-initiated factual inquiries that arise in ajudicial con-
text and ease the burden of performing difficult judicial tasks. In
commendingJudge DeMascio for his conduct in Bradley, the Sixth Cir-
cuit implied that when up against "an extremely difficult (if not im-
146 Id. at 1330.
'47 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 1330-31.
150 See id. at 1331.Judge Boggs noted that "[w]ere this the case, [alljudges would] be
required to cancel [their] subscriptions to law reviews and newspapers, let alone special-
ized journals of any sort." Id.
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possible) assignment," judges should be permitted to engage in
beneficial ex parte communications. 151
These cases, however, fail to provide judges with adequate gui-
dance as to what exactly constitutes permitted judicial conduct as re-
lated to the sua sponte, ex parte acquisition of scientific, technical, or
other specialized evidence in light of the general prohibitions against
such behavior as set forth in the Code of Conduct and 28 U.S.C. § 455.
For example, if ajudge acquires, through sua sponte, exparte communi-
cations, relevant specialized knowledge that increases the likelihood
that the judge will reach the "correct" decision, it is unclear whether
the Supreme Court would consider the communications appropriate
judicial conduct. The fact that the Code of Conduct and 28 U.S.C. § 455
do not explicitly prohibitjudges from acquiring potentially prejudicial
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge compounds this
ambiguity.
A. The Modem Trend: Valuing Outcome over Adversarial
Process
By failing to address whether a judge's sua sponte, ex parte acquisi-
tion of scientific, technical, or other specialized evidence is appropri-
ate judicial conduct when this behavior increases the likelihood of
correct outcomes, the Supreme Court has tacitly approved of the
modem trend toward allowing trial judges to assume a more active
role in the scientific and technical fact-finding process to achieve the
end goals of Daubert, Joiner, and Kum/o. Stressing that the ultimate
objective of the judicial gatekeeping role is to ensure the reliability
and relevancy of expert testimony, 52 the Court has placed a greater
value on outcome than on adversarial process.
In Kumho, the Court reiterated that trial judges have the obliga-
tion "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the court-
room the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the prac-
tice of an expert in the relevant field."' 53 However, the Court dodged
the questions raised in the post-Daubert, pre-Kuinho era regarding
judges' lack of scientific and technical expertise and the extent to
which judges may utilize extrajudicial educational resources to assist
in their gatekeeping duties. Instead, the Court compounded the am-
151 Bradley v. illiken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1158 (6th Cir. 1980) ("DistrictJudge DeMascio
was faced with an extremely difficult (if not impossible) assignment, confronted as he was
with the responsibility of formulating a decree which would eliminate the unconstitutional
segregation found to exist in the Detroit public schools, without transgressing the limits
established by the Supreme Court." (quoting Bradley v. MUillken, 540 F.2d 229, 236 (6th
Cir. 1976)).
152 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
153 Id. at 152.
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biguities surrounding the gatekeeping role by stating in Kumho that
"the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular
case how to go about determining whether particular expert testi-
mony is reliable."15 4 In particular, the Court noted that "[t]he trial
court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an
expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or
other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys
when it decides whether that expert's relevant testimony is reliable."'
Additionally, Kumho fails to provide trial judges with cautionary
guidance that would keep judicial scientific and technical fact-finding
within the parameters set forth in the Code of Conduct or 28 U.S.C.
§§ 144 and 455. The only limit Kumho sets is subjecting Rule 702 deci-
sions to abuse-of-discretion appellate review. 1 6 Moreover, as the
Sixth Circuit's approach in Bradley and Bonds demonstrates, circuit
courts will not likely view as abuses of discretion those actions that trial
judges take to ease the burdens of their challenging gatekeeping tasks
and increase their chances of making "correct" admissibility
determinations.
B. Increasing the Likelihood of "Correct" Outcomes
1. Judge Marlow's Approach Favoring Sua Sponte, Ex Parte
Communications
Although members of the scientific and legal communities con-
tinue to disagree over the extent to which trial judges may obtain sci-
entific and technical information neither presented nor cited by the
parties, 57 the modem consensus favors a more activist role forjudges
in the fact-finding process.' 58 As Judge George Marlow has con-
cluded, "a consensus has developed that trial judges faced with diffi-
cult, complex issues of science ought to be allowed, and perhaps even
encouraged, to seek scientific research and other information not
154 Id. (emphasis added); see also Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 2, at 331 ("While Kunio
has clarified that the Daubert rules apply not only to scientific but to all technical and other
specialized knowledge, it has compounded problems for litigants by giving trial judges
broad discretion to determine in each case which of the Daubert criteria they wish to
apply.").
155 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. The "leeway" the trial judge has to determine the methods
to use in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony is subject to review only under the
abuse-of-discretion standard as articulated in Joiner. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 138-39 (1997) (noting that a court of appeals must apply an abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard when reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony).
156 Rule 702 grants the trial judge discretion to determine the methods used to fulfill
his gatekeeping duties. See FED. R. Evm. 702.
157 Cf Joseph A. Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Tria4 30 ARuz. L. REV.
51, 73 (1988) (noting that there exist "great differences of opinion about the proper role
of the courts").
158 See Marlow, supra note 5, at 330.
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supplied by the attorneys, particularly in cases that involve issues likely
to have far-reaching impact." 5 9 This consensus has evolved from the
belief thatjudges who preside passively and neutrally over adversarial
proceedings involving complex matters may not fully understand the
magnitude of the issues at hand or be able to critically evaluate prof-
fered expert testimony.'6 Advocates of increased judicial participa-
tion in the fact-finding process believe that such behavior will lead to
more accurate and just results.' 61 Judge Marlow, however, conditions
his own view with the assurance that "[s]uch sua spante, ex parte re-
search should be allowed only if judicial exploration outside the re-
cord is subject to strict procedural controls designed to honor and
protect the parties' due process rights."162
In particular, Judge Marlow suggests thatjudges should be free to
venture into the library or onto the Internet during the decision-mak-
ing process in order to supplement their understanding of the com-
plex matters at hand.163 Not only does Marlow contend that sua sponte
research will assist a judge in comprehending complex issues, but he
believes that "[s]uch research is more efficient and less costly than
requiring litigants to invite live experts to explain scientific theory,
particularly if the need... arises in courts located in remote geo-
graphical areas." 64 In order to achieve these objectives, Marlow pro-
poses that the judicial codes of conduct be amended to include the
following provision:
A trial judge may, sua sponte and ex pare search for and read re-
search material and other literature, not presented or cited by the
parties, concerning issues of science or technology directly applica-
ble or relevant to a pending or impending proceeding before the
judge; provided the judge gives notice to the parties of the material
and literature consulted and, in a manner within thejudge's discre-
tion, affords them reasonable time to comment and submit other
relevant material. This provision shall only apply to material found
exparte and on which the judge intends to rely for a decision about
159 I.
160 SeeJack B. Weinstein, EthkicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigalion, 88 Nw. U. L RE%, 469,
P39 (1994) ("A rigid conception of the judge as presiding passively and neutrally over an
adversarial proceeding in which the litigants bear the whole burden of presentation is
sometimes inaccurate and unwise.... Justice ... is not blind, nor should it be.").
161 Judge Marlow, for example, proposes an amendment to the rules ofjudicial con-
duct that will "enable judges to render decisions reflecting society's mature and informed
judgment." Marlow, supra note 5, at 330; see also id. at 334 (setting out Marlow's proposed
amendment). He suggests that in order to achieve this goal we must "allow judges, when
they deem it necessary in lawsuits involving difficult questions of technological or social
science, to look beyond evidence presented by the attorneys." Id. at 331.
162 Id. at 330.
163 See id. at 334.
164 Id
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the admissibility of physical or social scientific and technological evi-
dence in a case. 165
Although self initiated research may increase the likelihood of
judges reaching the correct outcome, permitting judges to venture
into cyberspace or the library to acquire specialized knowledge for
individual cases poses serious problems both to the independence
and impartiality of the judiciary and to the integrity of the adversarial
system. First, case-specific factual research by judges runs counter to
the spirit of our legal system which values the adversarial presentation
of evidence. Second, even if judges give notice to the parties of the
material, literature, and persons consulted, courts will become in-
creasingly burdened with Rule 104(a) hearings in which the parties
must evaluate and challenge the judge's own independent findings.1 r6
This would necessarily increase the cost of litigation and the amount
of time necessary to resolve complex disputes. Third, self-initiated fac-
tual investigations by judges diminish the incentives for counsel to
165 Id.
166 One proposal to avoid such problems is the use of pretrial colloquia and scientific
peer review. See Comment, The Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to AssistJudges in the
Admissibility GateeepingMandated by Daubert, 34 Hous. L. REV. 527 (1997) [hereinafter Peer
Review and Colloquia]. Student author Lawrence Pinsky suggests that pretrial colloquia
would provide all participants in the litigation the opportunity "to interact with each other
directly" and to inform and educate "thejudge and her law clerks in the details of all of the
salient issues involved." Id. at 577. In particular, Pinsky believes that:
(t]he benefits of holding ajudicial colloquia [sic] over the more traditional
adversarial in limine hearings would be manifold:
1) the open format allows questions to be posed directly by opposing
experts to each other, as well as allowing the attorneys, the judge, and
the judge's clerks to ask questions of the experts;
2) experts from both sides can describe the methodology employed in
a pure lecture format;
3) the use of an expert-to-expert dialog allows a more rapid closure on
the issues of agreement and disagreement, putting the two in a better
perspective than is typical in the case of a sequential adversarial presen-
tation with intervening cross-examinations by nonexpert attorneys con-
trolling the discourse;
4) colloquia are more predictable as far as scheduling speaking and
question and answer times are concerned; and
5) the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply, so it is possible to pro-
hibit evidentiary objections.
Id. at 571-72. Furthermore, Pinsky explains that peer review is effective for the following
reasons:
First, peer review is the technique that science itself has evolved to evaluate
claimed discoveries, research results, and the merits of proposed research.
Second, peer review places the task of evaluating the technical claims made
in the proffered testimony on the shoulders of those presumably most com-
petent to judge the validity of the methodology and to comment on the
nature of any deficiencies. Third, peer review has the potential to restrain
expert witnesses from making, and lawyers from propounding, claims in
the first place that might seem reasonable to lay evaluators, but that will be
more quickly exposed as spurious by their professional colleagues.
Id. at 554.
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prepare their witnesses effectively and to educate the judge and jury
on complex matters in language understandable to lay persons.
2. Judge Weinstein's Approach Favoring Acquisition of General
Knowledge Within Reasonable Limits
Other judges, including United States District Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, have proposed similar guidelines for permitting generalist
trial judges to gain sufficient knowledge to perform their gatekeeping
duties while at the same time maintaining their independence. Like
Judge Marlow, Judge Weinstein believes that it is desirable for judges
to gain as much general knowledge as possible about the matters
pending before them.167 However, unlike Judge Marlow who believes
that judges should be permitted to rely on sua sponte e parte commu-
nications and their own self-initiated research to assist them in their
gatekeeping duties, Judge Weinstein offers a more restrictive ap-
proach to the acquisition of knowledge to ensure that the public per-
ceives the judiciary to be fair and unbiased. 68
First, Judge Weinstein seems to suggest that judges should avoid
case-specific inquiries and seek out only general knowledge. Second,
Judge Weinstein proposes that while judges should be permitted to
gain as much general knowledge as possible, the information should
come from unbiased sources. 169 Furthermore, Judge Weinstein be-
167 See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 565.
168 See ida
169 See i&. Judge Weinstein offers the following list of suggestions:
1.Judges should be encouraged to gain as much general knowledge as pos-
sible, preferably from sources not tainted by venal or extreme ideologicall
views.
2. Educational institutions such as the American Bar Association, the Fed-
eral Judicial Center, ALI/ABA, local bar associations and law schools
should obtain funding for judicial education programs from the govern-
ment, neutral, or balanced sources.
3. Too rich a setting for conferences should be avoided.
4. Flouting byjudges of local sensibilities by public attendance at controver-
sial meetings should be avoided.
5. In case-specific situations,judges should rely on staff and parties and not
on third persons for advice on the law. Limited consultation iwith judges in
the same hierarchical level is often appropriate. On facts, the judge should
inform the parties of fact discovery and consultations outside the record.
6. Funding for educational programs is critical. It should come from
sources that will not benefit from the programs. Where possible, funding
through impartial buffering is desirable. Judges' expenses should be paid
by neutral government bodies or educational institutions. Joint meetings of
judges in a pending case should not be funded by attorney.
7. Disclosure of judges' participation in educational events is desirable.
Judges should make their calendars available to the general public. Semi-
nars and conferences should be publicized in legal newspapers describing
the agenda, the participants and the sponsors. Meetings should be open to
the public and practitioners where possible.
8. An independent source for the evaluation of the background of organi-
zations running programs judges ex'pect to attend is desirable.
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lieves that the parties should be made aware of ajudge's participation
in all types of educational events. 170
The difficulty with Judge Weinstein's approach, however, is deter-
mining what sources of knowledge are tainted by extreme ideological
views. Although judges may create the appearance of impropriety by
attending privately sponsored seminars, as long as the seminars deal
with general, rather than case-specific matters, no conflict of interest
will arise. Fortunately, numerous resources exist today that will allow
judges to improve their general scientific literacy while at the same
time maintaining their independence and impartiality.171
3. Other More General Approaches
a. The Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence
In 1994, the Federal Judicial Center published the Reference Man-
ual on Scientific Evidence (the "Reference Manual") in order to "assist
judges in managing expert evidence, primarily in cases involving is-
sues of science or technology."17 2 In particular, lawyers, judges, and
scientists prepared the three-part reference manual in order to "pro-
vide judges with quick access to information on specific areas of sci-
ence in a form that will be useful in dealing with disputes among
experts." 173 The first part of the manual introduces the fundamental
questions surrounding the management and admissibility of expert
testimony.174 The second section contains reference manuals in seven
9. Law clerks' backgrounds should be available for those interested.
10. Consultations with Special Masters, Rule 706 advisers, and otherjudges
about a case should be revealed to the parties if there is any possibility of
the information being significant.
Id.
170 See id. (number 7).
171 See, e.g., SHEILAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAIR LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AmFicA 221 (1995) (noting that "[m]any methods have been proposed to strengthen the
capacity of courts to evaluate scientific and technological controversies").
172 REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIEN-nFc EVIDENCE 1 (Fed.Judicial Ctr. ed., 1994) [herein-
after REFERENCE MANUAL]; see also John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of
Gateping. The FederaIJudicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74
N.C. L. REV. 1183, 1222-23 (1996) (critiquing the Reference Manual for its lack of an inter-
disciplinary approach to the scientific method and the attendant danger that judges will
misuse it); Laurens Walker &John Monahan, Daubert and the Reference Manual: An Essay
on the Future of Science in Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 837, 847 (1996) ("[1]n our view, Daubert and
the Reference Manual4 together, comprise a major commitment to the use of science in
law-a result much more significant than merely the establishment and elaboration of a
test governing the admissibility of scientific evidence."). See generally Kenneth Kreiling,
Managing Expert Evidence: An Overview, 36JumMETmcsJ. 121 (1996) (reviewing the REFER.
ENCE MANUAL).
173 REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 172, at 3.
174 See Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note
172, at 37, 56-67; William W. Schwarzer, Management of Expert Evidence, in REFERENCE MAN.
UAL, supra note 172, at 7, passim.
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different areas of expertise including toxicology, epidemiology, foren-
sic analysis of DNA, statistical inference, multiple regression analysis,
survey research, and estimation of economic loss.1 75 The third part
addresses the use of court-appointed experts and special masters. 176
The bulk of the Reference Manual consists of seven different refer-
ence guides, which are intended primarily to assist judges in their un-
derstanding of the epistemology of science and not to establish
specific minimum admissibility standards. 177 The reference guides
are intended to teach judges about the nature of the scientific method
rather than provide them with a detailed crash course in numerous
highly specialized fields.'78 This stated purpose reemphasizes the lim-
ited role ofjudges in the fact-finding process. Limited in scope and
widely distributed, the Reference Manual provides judges with a valua-
ble educational resource that poses little threat to the maintenance of
an impartial and independent federal judiciary. In addition to the
Reference Manual, judges may turn to other educational resources in
preparing themselves for their gatekeeping duties.17
b. Judicial Seminars
Of the various educational resources available today judicial sem-
inars have become a popular means by which judges may acquire
knowledge on timely scientific, technical, or other specialized matters
pending in courtrooms nationwide. Both public and private interests
sponsor these seminars which bring togetherjudges and experts from
a variety of specialized fields in fora that foster discussion and debate
over current topics in complex litigation. However, unlike the Refer-
175 See P. mN-cE M'uAtL, supra note 172, at 119-523.
176 SeeJoe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Villging, Court-Appointed Ee,1ts, in RF ERmacE NtM.
uA,, supra note 172, at 525, passim; Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters in RE cmcu~ , LMx.
uAT, supra note 172, at 575, passim.
177 See R.vrm, xcs I&NuAi., supra note 172, at 3. The introduction explains:
The reference guides do not instructjudges concerning the admissibility of
specific types of expert evidence or conclusions of specific scientific studies,
and they are not intended to establish minimum standards for acceptable
scientific testimony. Instead, they present a primer on the methods and
reasoning of selected areas of scientific evidence and suggest a series of
questions that will enable judges to identify issues that are likely to be dis-
puted among experts and to explore the underlying basis of proffered
evidence.
Id.
178 See, e.g., David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REa.r.
ENCE M-.xuA., supra note 172, at 331, 335 ("This reference guide focuses on the nature of
statistical thinking rather than on the rules of evidence or substantive legal doctrine.").
179 SeeJudith A. Hasko, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: FldbleJudidal
Screening of Scientific Expert Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 1995 Wis. L REv. 479,
505 ("Daubert s admissibility standard places considerable pressure on judges to become
familiar with the scientific methodology applicable to a given case. However, judges can
depend on a variety of educational and informational resources to facilitate their adjust-
ment to this responsibility.").
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ence Manual, judicial seminars vary greatly in content and may be
sponsored by private interests.
Judges' ventures outside their courtrooms to participate in semi-
nars on topics ranging from DNA evidence and the brain structures of
gender, sex, and love'8 0 to covariance, correlation, scatter plots, and
bivariate regression' 8' and ecological economics 18 2 have concerned
some commentators who caution that seminar sponsors with hidden
agendas may successfully bias unwaryjudges. 183 Alliance forJustice, a
180 See, e.g., Seminar, Law and Biology (Hanover, N.H., May 13-16, 1996) (sponsored
by the Federal judicial Center, Dartmouth College, the Gruter Institute, and Vermont Law
School) (materials on file with author). The following speakers, among others, gave
presentations on the following topics: William Rodgers (University of Washington Law
School): "Applying Biology to Law: An Introduction"; Timothy Goldsmith (Biology, Yale
University): "General Principles of Evolutionary Biology"; Ursula Goodenough (Biology,
Washington University): "Genetics and Behavior"; Miguel Marin-Padilla (Pathology,
Dartmouth Medical School): "How Does the Human Brain Work?"; Michael McGuire
(Neuropsychiatry, UCLA Medical School): "Neuroscience and Social Behavior"; Roger D,
Masters (Government, Dartmouth College): "Brain Chemistry, Learning Disabilities, and
Crime"; Edward Berger (Biology, Dartmouth College): "Human Genome Project"; Robert
Frank (Economics, Cornell University): "Economic Foundations of Morality"; Kenneth
Kreiling (Vermont Law School): "Lessons from DNA and Other Biological Forensic Evi-
dence"; Helen Fisher (Anthropology, Rutgers University): "The Brain Structures of Gen-
der, Sex and Love"; Oliver Goodenough (Vermont Law School): "Law in a Modular Mind";
E. Donald Elliott (Yale Law School): "Law and Biology: The New Synthesis."
181 See, e.g, Workshop, Statistical Concepts for Federal Judges (Marina del Rey, Cal.,
Jan. 10-12, 1996) (sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center) (materials on file with au-
thor). Judges heard presentations on the following: Orley Ashenfelter (Princeton Univer-
sity): "Data Description," "Sampling Distributions," and "Tests Involving Means"; Franklin
M. Fisher (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): "Measures of Dispersion," "Statistical
Significance and Legal Causation," and "Introduction to Multiple Regression"; Daniel L.
Rubinfeld (University of Cal., Berkeley): "Data Display and Presentation," "Tests Involving
Proportions," "Covariance, Correlation, Scatter Plots, and Bivariate Regression," and "In-
troduction to Multiple Regression."
182 See, e.g., Colloquium, FREE's 1995 Colloquium for Federal Judges: Environmental
Economics and Policy Analysis (Gallatin Gateway, Mont., Sept. 13-17, 1995) (sponsored by
the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment (FREE) and Lewis and
Clark Law School) (materials on file with author) [hereinafter FREE 1995].
183 See, e.g., Abner Mikva, The Wooing of OurJudges, N.Y. TimFs, Aug. 28, 2000, at A17
(suggesting that judicial integrity is sacrificed "when private interests are allowed to wine
and dine judges at fancy resorts under the prextext of 'educating' them").
On July 27, 2000, the Judicial Education Reform Act of 2000 was introduced in the
Senate in response to a report criticizingjudges' attendance at privately sponsoredjudicial
seminars. SeeJudicial Education Reform Act of 2000, S. 2990, 106th Congress (2000).
"The bill would prohibit federal judges from accepting 'anything of value in connection
with a seminar,'" and "[i]nstead the Board of the Federal Judicial Center would have the
power to authorize government funding for judges to attend only those 'seminars that are
conducted in a manner so as to maintain the public's confidence in an unbiased and fair-
minded judiciary.'" Addendum to the Report of the Executive Committee, at http://
w.uscourts.gov/Press-Releases/addendumexec.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2000). How-
ever, on September 19, 2000, theJudicial Conference of the United States voted to oppose
the bill "because the legislation is overly broad, would have unintended consequences, and
has not been adequately studied." Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Confer-
ence Opposes Sweeping Restrictions on Education Programs, at http://ivww.uscourts.gov/
PressReleases/press09l92000.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2000).
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nonprofit organization, issued a report suggesting that sponsorship of
law and economics seminars by powerful business interests has cre-
ated a legal system in which justice can be bought and sold just like
any other commodity18 4 Challenging this view, James Pierson, execu-
tive director of the John M. Olin Foundation, which has funded semi-
nars on law and economics for judges, argued that "judges are
perfectly capable of assessing law and economics on their own without
being told what to think."18 5
While nonprofit organizations such as the Federal Judicial
Center, academic institutions, or state bar associations sponsor many
of today's judicial seminars,18 6 others receive funding directly or indi-
rectly from private corporate interests.187 Whethor not private inter-
184 See HenryJ. Reske, Expense-PaidJudieal Seminars Hit, 79 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1993, at 36.
185 Id.
186 See, eg., Seminar, The Judge's Role As Gatekeeper Responsibilities and Powers
(Houston, Tex., Mar. 5, 1997) (sponsored by the Texas Center for theJudicasy, the Texas
Bar Foundation, and the Harvard Law School Center for Law and Information Technol-
ogy) (materials on file with author). This seminar brought together "a balanced panel of
judges and lawyers" to "explore the nature of the judge's responsibility for overseeing the
quality and sufficiency of circumstantial and scientific evidence, and the range ofjudicial
powers using court-appointed experts to assist in the process." Id. Charles Nesson, Profes-
sor, Harvard Law School, moderated the seminar and the participants included: Marcia
Angeli, M.D., Executive Editor, New England Journal of fedicine Boston, Mass.; John
Comyn, Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, Austin, Tex.; Dick DeGuerin, Attorney.
DeGuerin & Dickson, Houston, Tex.; Robert Dickson, Attorney, Dickson, Carlson, &
Campino, Santa Monica, Cal.; Fredric Ellis, Attorney, Ellis & Rapacki, Boston, Mass.; Raul
Gonzales, Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, Austin, Tex; Barry Nace, Attorney, Pauson,
Nace & Nonvind, Washington, D.C.; Michael O'Neill, Judge, 193d District Court, Dallas,
Tex.; and Sharma Swan, Ph.D., California Dept. of Health Services, Berkeley, Cal.
187 See FREE 1995, supra note 182. FREE's mission is to "advance[ ] conservation and
environmental values by applying modem science and America's founding ideals to policy
debates." THE FREE REPORT (Found. for Research on Econ. and the Env't, Bozeman,
Mont.), vol. 3, issue 1, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter FREE REPORT]. FREE's program objectives
are to:
explain the linkages among science, risk analysis and economics; show how
secure property rights and economic freedom can foster the efficient and
sensitive use of natural resources and ecosystem preservation; show how the
application of economics to law provides insights into the public interest;
describe ways in which incentives and voluntary cooperation can be used to
protect and enhance environmental values while fostering economic pros-
perity; and explore and foster positive, constructive roles of government
officials and federal agencies.
Id. at 5. In 1999, FREE offered two introductory seminars in environmental economics
and policy analysis and an advanced program in "Bringing Economics and Ethics to Cli-
mate Change." See id. at 7. Lecturers at this program included Dr.Jerry Mahlman, Direc-
tor of the Geophysics Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton University, Professor Rick
Revesz, NewYork University Law School; and Professor Thomas Schelling of the University
of Maryland. See id. at 7. According to the FREE Report, "[i]n both 1997 and 1998 approx-
imately eight percent of the federal judiciary participated in (the] four seminars [offered
by FREE.]" Id. at 6-7. In 1999, FREE had revenues of $513,600 from FREE programs,
$130,100 from corporate contributions, and $2,110 from individual contributions. See id.
at 11. For more information on FREE, see FREF, Foundation for Rsarch onFaonomics & the
Environrent, at http://free-eco.org. (last visited Aug. 16, 2000).
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ests are improperly influencing judges at judicial seminars remains a
matter of great debate. Nonetheless, while judges should be en-
couraged to gain general knowledge in a wide range of disciplines
frequently appearing in their courtrooms, attempts to independently
investigate case-specific, factual disputes should be strictly forbidden.
One approach to preventing self-initiated, specialized inquiries is to
require judges to regularly attend courses in judicial ethics. 188
c. Court-Appointed Experts
Judges may also appoint independent technical advisors under
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to ease the burden of their gatekeeping
duties.'8 9 Rule 706 grants a trial court the authority to appoint expert
188 See Howard T. Markey, A Need for Continuing Education in Judicial Ethics, 28 VAL. U.
L. REV. 647, 656 (1994) (arguing that "[m]aintenance of the highest standards ofjudiclal
ethics is ... more than ever critical to the judiciary's continued legitimacy and public
acceptance" and recommending that "[m]andatory courses in judicial ethics should be
instituted and regularly attended by each judge").
189 Rule 706, entitled "Court Appointed Experts," provides:
(a) Appointment The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be ap-
pointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court
may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may ap-
point expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be
appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so ap-
pointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court in writing, a
copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the
parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall
advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition
may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the
court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party, including a party calling the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever sum the court may allow .... [Except where the
law provides a fund as in criminal actions,] compensation shall be paid by
the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and
thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the
expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in
calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
FED. R. EvlD. 706.
In Regents of the University of California v. Oncor, Inc., No. C-95-3084-VRW, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15068 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1997), a complex patent case involving techniques
used to map DNA, DistrictJudge Vaughn I Walker turned to Rule 706 for assistance:
Having devoted a very lengthy time to the issues in the present motions, the
undersigned has concluded this is one of those cases that may call for the
appointment of a court-appointed expert. The issues in this litigation are
of unusual difficulty and complexity, involving questions well beyond and
in a setting or context far removed from the regular ken of issues which
courts are called upon to decide. The court is mindful of the encourage-
ment which the Supreme Court has given to the use of such experts and
the need to ensure that the use of such experts not abdicate the responsibil-
ities of the court. Still, the months entailed in the court's consideration of
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witnesses of its own selection, but requires these experts to advise the
parties of their findings and subject themselves to cross-examina-
tion.190 These requirements seek to provide the parties with all rele-
vant evidence that the judge may utilize in the decision-making
process as well as to ensure that judges do not rely on information
acquired through their own independent investigations.191 However,
"Rule 706 does not explicitly address the issue of whether the judge
and the appointed expert may communicate ex parte [sic] during the
course of the litigation.1 92 Rule 706 also fails to address whether
court-appointed experts, who are often intimately involved in the
judge's decision-making process, may engage in ex parte communica-
tions with the parties. 193 Thus, some tension exists between the free-
doms Rule 706 affords to judges and the teachings that the Code of
Conduct and 28 U.S.C. § 455 impart.
While many commentators have suggested that judges should
take advantage of Rule 706 more often, researchers at the Federal Ju-
dicial Center discovered that an ovenvhelming majority of federal dis-
trict judges responding to a survey reported that they had never
appointed a Rule 706 expert.194 According to the study, one reason
for the low appointment rate is that many judges have expressed con-
cem that the appointment of experts would undermine the adver-
sarial process. 195 However, according to the Federal Judicial Center
survey on court-appointed experts, the judges who appointed experts
the issues here has caused an unreasonable delay in the resolution of the
issues, resulting in an unfairness to the parties at bar and an unreasonable
distraction from the demands of other cases.
I&. at*51-52 (citations omitted); see also Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387,
1392-93 (D. Or. 1996) (illustrating the appointment of independent technical advisors
"with the necessary expertise in the fields of epidemiology, immunology/toxicology, rheu-
matology, and chemistry to assist in evaluating the reliability and relevance of the scientific
evidence").
190 See FF. R.Evm. 706(a).
191 Some commentators have expressed concern that the Court has not articulated
how exactly judges may utilize appointed experts under FRE 706. &,, eg., Improving
Caekeeping, supra note 17, at 947 (noting that because the Court has not expressed whether
court-appointed experts should act as uitnesses at formal eidentiary hearings or as infor-
mal advisors to the court, "[c]ourts concerned with upholding Daubrf'smndate must...
develop procedures that prevent (judges from delegating gatekeeping duties to the ex-
pert], that ensure that litigants are dealt with fairly and are given an opportunity to rebut
the expert's daims, and that ... accommodate the judge's need for flexible interaction
with the expert").
192 Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, AceptingDaubert's Initation: Defining a R!efor
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientiflc Validij, 43 Etom" LJ. 995, 1029 (1994).
193 See id. at 1033.
194 See Cecil & Willging, supra note 176, at 535.
195 See id. at 540.
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have been "almost unanimous in expressing their satisfaction with the
expert." 96
As suggested by one commentator, although the use of court-ap-
pointed experts under Rule 706 may "improv[e] the quality of deci-
sions, particularly on technically complex issues," "more guidance on
appointment procedures and communications with the expert [is
needed to] help minimize the risks entailed in this departure from
adversary procedures." 19 7 The potential for abuse under Rule 706 is
great, and private communications between judges and technical advi-
sors may have a devastating effect on the adversarial system. For these
reasons, Congress and the Supreme Court should modify the Code of
Conduct, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) in a
way that will restrict the discretion Rule 706 currently affords judges.
d. Scientific Panels or Professional Societies
In addition to the use of court-appointed experts, some commen-
tators have proposed that judges turn to scientific panels or profes-
sional societies for assistance in dealing with complex matters.,, In
1998 at the 150th annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS), Justice Stephen Breyer suggested
that court-appointed experts and technical advisors may be of great
assistance to judges. 99 Justice Breyer, whose remarks paralleled his
concurring opinion in Joiner,200 suggested that because judges are
playing an increasingly important role in screening scientific experts,
advice from neutral parties in the scientific community may be of
great assistance to generalist judges.201
In relating his own experience in a case involving doctor-assisted
suicide, Justice Breyer noted that the Court received numerous friend-
of-the-court briefs from a variety of health-care professionals and ex-
perts in related fields.202 Justice Breyer stressed to the AAAS that
"[s]uch briefs help to educate the judges on potentially relevant tech-
196 Id. at 537; see alsoJ. Madeleine Nash, Ruling Out 7unk Science, "TIME, Dec. 30, 1996 -
Jan. 6, 1997, at 102 (praising Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or.
1997), in whichJudge Robert E.Jones appointed scientific experts to aid in his decision to
exclude "junk science" on breast implants).
197 Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and
Deference, 77 OR. L. REv 59, 155 (1998).
198 See, e.g., Peer Review and Colloquia, supra note 166, at 54647.
199 See Justice Breyer Calls for Experts to Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 17,
1998, at A17 [hereinafterJustice Breyer Calls]; see also Richard Monastersky, Courting Reliable
Science: Judges Seek to Improve Use of Scientyilc Experts in Tials, 153 Sc. NEWs, Apr. 18, 1998, at
249, 249 (discussing Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Joiner and his speech to the
AAAS).
200 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
201 See Justice Breyer Calls, supra note 199, at A17.
202 See Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 Sci., Apr. 24, 1998, at
537, 538; supra note 199.
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nical matters, helping to make us, not experts, but moderately edu-
cated laypersons, and that education improves the quality of our
decisions."20 3 Furthermore, Justice Breyer suggested "that in this age
of science we must build legal foundations that are sound in science as
well as in law. Scientists have offered their help. We in the legal com-
munity should accept that offer, and we are in the process of doing
so."204
In response to Justice Breyer's remarks, the AAAS, in conjunction
with the American Bar Association and the Federal Judicial Center,
launched a project "to test the feasibility of increased use of court-
appointed experts in cases that present technical issues."205 The pro-
ject, aimed at both civil and criminal litigation, "will provide a slate of
candidates to serve as court-appointed experts in cases in which the
court has determined that the traditional means of clarifying issues
under the adversarial system are unlikely to yield the information that
is necessary for a reasoned and principled resolution of the disputed
issues."20 6
C. The Problems with Valuing Outcome over Process and the
Need for New Limits
The Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trilogy, in conjunction with the "liberal
thrust" of the Federal Rules,207 has caused trial judges to become in-
creasingly comfortable with the notion that they can and should delve
much deeper into the scientific and technical fact-finding process
than they could under Frye20 This modern evolution of the rules
governing expert evidence is due in large part to the growing consen-
sus that increased scientific literacy among judges will necessarily in-
crease the likelihood of correct outcomes. However, in focusing on
outcomes, the Court has ignored the process values underlying the
Code of Conduct and the federal judicial disqualification statutes.
With the primary focus on outcome-that is, in ensuring that all
admitted testimony is both relevant and reliable-the Court has both
203 Breyer, supra note 202, at 538.
204 I&
205 Supreme Court Justice Beats Drum for Afore Use of Sdendsts, TEsTIrMRNG Exrr, Mar.
1998, at 1, 2 [hereinafterJusticeBeatsDnim]; see alsoAmerican Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, Court Appointed Scientifis Experts: A Demonstration P1qroJ of the AAAS, at
http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2000) ("Judges wishing to
appoint experts under any source of authority vill be able to call project staff for assistance
in identffying highly qualified scientists and engineers who will serve as experts to the
courts, rather than to the parties to litigation.").
206 Justice Beats Drum, supra note 205, at 2.
207 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (quoting Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
208 Fye instructed judges simply to determine whether or not a scientific theory en-
joyed general acceptance. See supra Part I.A
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sacrificed process values and granted trial judges virtually unlimited
discretion in the decision-making process. In light of the considera-
ble amount of commentary following Daubert, it is surprising that the
Kumho Court failed to discuss the values that guide the judicial role in
the adversarial system. In particular, the Court could have addressed
the continued need for judges to adhere to a general set of ethical
and legislative codes such as the Code of Conduct and 28 U.S.C. §§ 144
and 455, which share a general purpose in promoting an impartial
and unbiased judiciary. Instead, the Court has given trial judges per-
mission to become scientific arbiters who substantively evaluate the
competing and divergent methods and opinions of scientific
experts.209
Under Kumho, judges' attempts to discover what are perceived to
be knowable and objective scientific truths are clearly at odds with the
process values the Code of Conduct and the federal judicial disqualifica-
tion statutes set forth. Yet the reasons for this conflict between out-
come and process values are apparent. Proponents of a greater
judicial role in the scientific fact-finding process assume that there are
scientific "truths" hiding somewhere between diametrically opposed
expert opinions and thatjudges can find them.210 However, the scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized matters that lie at the heart of
competing expert opinions often present questions that are currently
unanswerable. Requiring judges to reach final conclusions on dis-
puted scientific and technical matters may not only lead to incorrect
conclusions but may also place judges in the awkward position of
resolving disputes that experts in the field are unable to resolve.211
Thus, to grant trial judges the authority to decide among competing
expert opinions in fields outside the judge's expertise, especially those
which involve complex, unsettled questions, is to disregard the adver-
209 See Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 CAR.
DOZO L. REv. 1945, 1945 (1994) (noting that "[s]ome of these efforts by federaljudges [to
act as scientific arbiters] have been almost laughable in their failure to comprehend even
the most fundamental principles of scientific methodology").
210 Anthony Z. Roisman, The Implications of G.E. v. Joiner forAdmssibility of Expert Testi-
mony, in EmIRONMENTAL LmGaxrON 491, 508-09 (ALA-ABA Course of Study Materials
SC84, 1998) (concluding that this view is often used to justify the usefulness of court-ap-
pointed experts).
211 See Peter Huber, Address at The Fifteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (June 12, 1997), in 180 F.RD. 467,
484 (1998) (suggesting that because there is no stable systemwide mechanism to reach
final decisions on basic questions of scientific and technical fact, " [t] he process often dic-
tates results that are completely opposite to what the substance dictates"); see alsoJocelyn
Kaiser, Synergy Paper Questioned at Toxicology Meeting 275 Sci., Mar. 28, 1997, at 1879
(presenting an example of how studies involving similar chemicals may differ in their
conclusions).
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sarial system's fundamental reliance on jurors to resolve challenging
issues of fact at the conclusion of a trial.212
With a hint of skepticism, the Ninth Circuit on remand in Daubert
expressed its concern over the post-Daubert gatekeeping role.213 Judge
Kozinski defined a role that requires judges to resolve currently unan-
swerable scientific questions:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court's opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-
credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise,
in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what
is not "good science," and occasionally to reject such expert testi-
mony because it was not "derived by the scientific method."214
Proponents of increased judicial discretion and sua sponte scien-
tific research have argued that lax admissibility standards will inun-
date jurors with expert testimony, confuse them, and lead them to
212 See Roisman, supra note 209, at 1953 (suggesting that "there is wide consensus that
the best system for resolving disputes is the dcviljury system"). Roisman notes that a 1992
report from an American Bar Association/Brookings Institute Symposium identified five
virtues of the jury system which make it an effective system for resolving disputes:
First, the jury is a valuable process for decisionmaking and an effective
means for arriving at a fair resolution of disputed facts ....
Second, the jury provides important protections against the abuse of
power by legislatures, judges, the government, business, or other powerful
entities ....
Third .... juries provide the best mechanism for bringing broadly
based community values to bear on the issues involved in private disputes
but doing so with their public function in mind ....
Fourth, the jury provides an important check on the bureaucratization
and professionalization of the legal system ....
Finally, the jury system provides a means for legitimizing the outcome
of dispute resolution and facilitating public understanding and support for
and confidence in our legal system.
1d. (quoting THE BRoomiNGs INsTur.TION, CHARTING A FrrURE FOR THE CIVILJUKY SW-MI 8-
10 (1992)) (omissions in the original).
While critics of the jury system tend largely to disregard the values set forth by the
Brookings Institution Report and assert that sympathetic jurors often ignore obvious scientific
flaws in the scientific evidence presented by plaintiffs' experts, some studies suggest that
juries are becoming increasingly antiplaintiff and probusiness as a result of the successful
efforts of tort reform advocacy groups. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Hender-
son, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products LiabiliV, 39 UCLA L RE%. 731, 787-95 (1992);
Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases:
Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAw & Soc'vRzv. 85,93-107(1992). Others
have suggested that juries may even be better suited than judges to distinguish good sci-
ence from bad science. See, eg., Richard B. Schmitt, 117o Is an Expert? In Some Courtroom,
The Answer Is Nobody,' WALL ST. J., June 17, 1997, at Al ("In the past, juries have been
criticized for being dazzled by expert testimony and rendering verdicts based on emotion
rather than intellect. But whether a system that relies onjudges to decide which scientists
are believable is any more evenhanded or just is hotly debated.").
213 SeeDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 869 (1995).
214 Id
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favor the wrong expert.215 However, several studies of civil jury ver-
dicts reveal that in cases involving the presentation of competing sci-
entific views, juries have reached the correct results.2 16 Furthermore,
many lawyers refrain from challenging the admissibility of their oppo-
nents' questionable scientific and technical testimony in an effort to
destroy weak experts during cross-examinations. 217 Effective cross-ex-
amination of a weak expert can often devastate the opposing side's
case.
IV
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
UNITED STATES JUDGES, 28 U.S.C. § 455, AND
RuLE 104(a)
In order to preserve the integrity of the adversarial system and
maintain an impartial and unbiased federal judiciary in the wake of
the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trilogy, the Judicial Conference should mod-
ify the Code of Conduct for United States Judges to include the following
provision:
A trial judge must not (1) acquire case-specific scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge, evidence or information not presented or cited by the
parties to the litigation or an expert appointed under Rule 706, or (2) en-
gage in sua sponte, ex parte communications in order to obtain knowl-
edge, evidence, or information concerning issues directly applicable or
relevant to a pending or impending proceeding before the judge.
Although Canon 3(A) (4) of the Code currently prohibits "ex parte
communications on the merits," the Canon provides exceptions to
this prohibition "as authorized by law."2 1 Furthermore, as previously
noted, the Code is cast in general terms and is unenforceable whenever
reasonable judges may disagree over the meaning of certain provi-
sions.219 Thus, because judges may reasonably disagree over whether
the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trilogy creates an exception for the acquisi-
215 Cf Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientifc Evidence: A Critique
From the Perspective ofJuror Psychology, 100 MIL. L. REV. 99, 111-18 (1983) (discussing and
criticizing the assumption that lay jurors cannot understand complex scientific evidence).
216 See id.; see also Nel Vidmar, AreJuries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involv..
ing Scientific/Medical Issues?. Some Data From Medical Malpractice, 43 EMoRy LJ. 885, 907
(1994) (concluding that "the data indicate thatjuries are not systematically biased against
doctors and that in the preponderance of cases they make reasonable decisions").
217 See The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, 77JuDicAraxu 68, 69 (1993).
As stated by criminal attorney RobertJ. Hirsh of Tuscon, Arizona at the American Judica-
ture Society meeting on March 6, 1993, which addressed the use, misuse, and systemic
impact of expert witnesses in court: "I take the trial lawyer's view that if you have an expert
who really doesn't have a well-founded claim, you are going to be able to destroy that claim
in cross-examination." Id.
218 CODE oF CoNDucr, supra note 12, at 6.
219 See id. at 2-3.
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tion of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, the Judi-
cial Conference should modify Canon 3(A) (4) to prohibit all
exceptions and to clarify that all sua sponte, ex parte communications
are prohibited.
Furthermore, Congress should modify 28 U.S.C. § 455 to include
the following italicized provision:
(a) Anyjustice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall dis-
qualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding, including possession of any case-
specific scientfic, technical, or other specialized knowledge, evi-
dence, or information not presented or cited by the parties to the
litigation or an expert appointed under Rule 706, or where he has
engaged in sua sponte, ex parte communications in order to ob-
tain knowledge, evidence, or information concerning issues directly
applicable or relevant to the proceedings pending or impending
before the judge .... 220
Finally, the Supreme Court should move to modify Rule 104(a) to
include the following italicized provision:
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions con-
ceming the qualification of a person to be a witness, the exis-
tence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivi-
sion (b). Although [,In making its determination the court is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges, the trial judge is prohibited from engaging in sua sponte,
ex parte communications in order to obtain any case-specfic scientiffi,
technica4 or other specialized knowledge, eviden4e, or information con-
cerning issues directly applicable or relevant to the proceedings pending
or impending before the judge.22 1
These proposed modifications should not be read to prohibit
judges from seeking general knowledge on the performance and
function of their gatekeeping role or on general scientific and techno-
logical matters. Judges may appropriately acquire general knowledge
by utilizing the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual, attending
publicly and privately sponsored seminars on general topics in litiga-
tion, or appointing experts under Rule 706. However, in order to
maintain the independence and impartiality of the federal judiciary,
220 The italicized portion is the author's proposed amendment to 28 U.S.Q § 455
(1994).
221 The italicized portion (except for the heading) is the author's proposed amend-
ment to FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
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judges must not seek highly specialized, case-specific knowledge while
a case is pending or impending or assume an overactive role in resolv-
ing highly technical scientific disputes. As Professor Sheila Jasanoff
has cautioned, "[w]hen judges exclude expert testimony, appoint
their own expert witnesses, or render summary judgments, they ines-
capably give up the role of dispassionate observer to become partici-
pants in a particular construction (or... deconstruction) of scientific
facts."222 The modifications this Note proposes to the Code of Conduct,
28 U.S.C. § 455, and Rule 104(a) would ensure that judges adhere to
their assigned roles as impartial and dispassionate gatekeepers and
make decisions based solely on the adversarial presentation of
evidence.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Kumho, our nation's trial judges face a pressing
dilemma: they can either (1) acquire all relevant scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge that will increase the likelihood of
making correct admissibility decisions, even if this requires engaging
in sua sponte, exparte communications, or (2) refrain from engaging in
any activities that may adversely affect their ability to remain impartial
by adhering to a general set of ethical and legislative rules intended to
preserve the integrity of the adversarial system. Sparked by the Su-
preme Court's tacit approval in the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trilogy of in-
creased judicial involvement in the fact-finding process, the majority
sentiment at the onset of the new millennium is that judges should
adopt the former approach.
However, as judges become more actively involved in the scien-
tific and technical fact-finding process, the values that underlie the
adversarial system will erode. No longer will judges rely solely upon
the evidence and arguments presented by the parties to make admissi-
bility determinations, but they will conduct an increasing number of
Rule 104(a) pretrial hearings in which the parties must critically evalu-
ate and challenge the judges' own scientific findings. The problem
with this result is that when judges take it upon themselves to indepen-
dently research the scientific and technological facts in dispute, the
parties are no longer afforded the unbiased and impartial gatekeepers
that our system both guarantees and depends upon. Under the new
set ofjudicial rules proposed in this Note, judges would be prohibited
from engaging in sua sponte, ex parte communications, and be forced
to base their admissibility determinations solely upon the evidence
presented by the parties.
222 SheilaJasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77JUDCA rvnrE
77, 82 (1993).
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